This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design,…mehr
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Section 1. Getting to Work: 1. Politics sets the stage; 2. Designing for multiple goals; 3. Comparing seller revenues; 4. The academic critics; 5. Plan for this book; Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach; Section 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: 6. Formulation; 7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies; 8. Balancing the budget; 9. Uniqueness; 10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction; 11. Conclusion; Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence: 12. Hottelling's lemma; 13. The envelope theorem in integral form; 14. Quasi-linear payoffs; 15. Conclusion; Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences: 16. The single crossing conditions; 17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies; 18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model; 19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions; 20. Conclusion; Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values: 21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'?; 22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions; 23. Wilson's drainage tract model; 24. Correlated types model interdependent values; 25. Conclusion; Section 6. Auctions in Context: 26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant; 27. Symmetric models with costly entry; 28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition; 29. After the bidding ends; 30. Conclusion; Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions; Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions: 31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions; 32. Simultaneous ascending auctions; 33. Conclusion; Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding: 34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems; 35. Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions; 36. Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions; 37. Conclusion.
Section 1. Getting to Work: 1. Politics sets the stage 2. Designing for multiple goals 3. Comparing seller revenues 4. The academic critics 5. Plan for this book Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach Section 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: 6. Formulation 7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies 8. Balancing the budget 9. Uniqueness 10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction 11. Conclusion Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence: 12. Hottelling's lemma 13. The envelope theorem in integral form 14. Quasi-linear payoffs 15. Conclusion Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences: 16. The single crossing conditions 17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies 18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model 19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions 20. Conclusion Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values: 21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'? 22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions 23. Wilson's drainage tract model 24. Correlated types model interdependent values 25. Conclusion Section 6. Auctions in Context: 26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant 27. Symmetric models with costly entry 28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition 29. After the bidding ends 30. Conclusion Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions: 31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions 32. Simultaneous ascending auctions 33. Conclusion Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding: 34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems 35. Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions 36. Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions 37. Conclusion.
Section 1. Getting to Work: 1. Politics sets the stage; 2. Designing for multiple goals; 3. Comparing seller revenues; 4. The academic critics; 5. Plan for this book; Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach; Section 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: 6. Formulation; 7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies; 8. Balancing the budget; 9. Uniqueness; 10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction; 11. Conclusion; Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence: 12. Hottelling's lemma; 13. The envelope theorem in integral form; 14. Quasi-linear payoffs; 15. Conclusion; Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences: 16. The single crossing conditions; 17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies; 18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model; 19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions; 20. Conclusion; Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values: 21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'?; 22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions; 23. Wilson's drainage tract model; 24. Correlated types model interdependent values; 25. Conclusion; Section 6. Auctions in Context: 26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant; 27. Symmetric models with costly entry; 28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition; 29. After the bidding ends; 30. Conclusion; Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions; Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions: 31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions; 32. Simultaneous ascending auctions; 33. Conclusion; Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding: 34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems; 35. Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions; 36. Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions; 37. Conclusion.
Section 1. Getting to Work: 1. Politics sets the stage 2. Designing for multiple goals 3. Comparing seller revenues 4. The academic critics 5. Plan for this book Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach Section 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: 6. Formulation 7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies 8. Balancing the budget 9. Uniqueness 10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction 11. Conclusion Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence: 12. Hottelling's lemma 13. The envelope theorem in integral form 14. Quasi-linear payoffs 15. Conclusion Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences: 16. The single crossing conditions 17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies 18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model 19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions 20. Conclusion Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values: 21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'? 22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions 23. Wilson's drainage tract model 24. Correlated types model interdependent values 25. Conclusion Section 6. Auctions in Context: 26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant 27. Symmetric models with costly entry 28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition 29. After the bidding ends 30. Conclusion Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions: 31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions 32. Simultaneous ascending auctions 33. Conclusion Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding: 34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems 35. Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions 36. Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions 37. Conclusion.
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'Paul Milgrom has combined fundamental work in economic theory and, in particular, the theory of auctions, with extensive practical participation in the auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum. This book is a brilliant synthesis of his own and others' contributions to the field. The impact of practical problems on the need for theory is thoroughly exemplified. The exposition of the theory has that complete ease only achievable through complete mastery and intense work.' Kenneth Arrow, Nobel Laureate, Stanford University
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