Preface Part I. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction: 1. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction 2. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction 3. The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions 4. Measuring the efficiency of an FCC spectrum auction Part II. The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats: 5. Combinatorial auction design 6. The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design 7. Spectrum auction design 8. A practical guide to the combinatorial clock auction 9. Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction 10. Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions 11. Core-selecting package auctions 12. A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions 13. On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions 14. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders 15. Properties of the combinatorial clock auction 16. Budget constraints combinatorial clock auctions 17. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions: about inconsistent bidding and its impact on efficiency in the combinatorial clock auction Part III. Alternative Auction Designs: 18. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation 19. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions 20. Hierarchical package bidding: a paper and pencil combinatorial auction 21. Assignment messages and exchanges 22. The product-mix auction: a new auction design for differentiated goods 23. The continuous combinatorial auction architecture 24. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions Part IV. Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs: 25. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms 26. Laboratory experimental testbeds: application to the PCS auction 27. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats 28. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design 29. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs 30. Spectrum auction design: simple auctions for complex sales Part V. The Bidders' Perspective: 31. Winning play in spectrum auctions 32. Up in the air: GTE's experience in the MTA auction for personal communication services licenses 33. Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction 34. Strategic bidding in combinatorial clock auctions - a bidder perspective 35. Impact of budget-contraints on the efficiency of multi-lot spectrum auctions Part VI. Secondary Markets and Exchanges: 36. Spectrum markets: motivation, challenges, and implications 37. Designing the US incentive auction 38. Solving the station repacking problem 39. ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange 40. ACE: a combinatorial market mechanism Outlook.
Preface Part I. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction: 1. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction 2. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction 3. The efficiency of the FCC spectrum auctions 4. Measuring the efficiency of an FCC spectrum auction Part II. The Combinatorial Clock Auction Formats: 5. Combinatorial auction design 6. The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design 7. Spectrum auction design 8. A practical guide to the combinatorial clock auction 9. Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction 10. Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions 11. Core-selecting package auctions 12. A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions 13. On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions 14. Ascending combinatorial auctions with risk averse bidders 15. Properties of the combinatorial clock auction 16. Budget constraints combinatorial clock auctions 17. (Un)expected bidder behavior in spectrum auctions: about inconsistent bidding and its impact on efficiency in the combinatorial clock auction Part III. Alternative Auction Designs: 18. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation 19. A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions 20. Hierarchical package bidding: a paper and pencil combinatorial auction 21. Assignment messages and exchanges 22. The product-mix auction: a new auction design for differentiated goods 23. The continuous combinatorial auction architecture 24. Coalition-based pricing in ascending combinatorial auctions Part IV. Experimental Comparisons of Auction Designs: 25. Experiments testing multiobject allocation mechanisms 26. Laboratory experimental testbeds: application to the PCS auction 27. An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats 28. On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design 29. Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs 30. Spectrum auction design: simple auctions for complex sales Part V. The Bidders' Perspective: 31. Winning play in spectrum auctions 32. Up in the air: GTE's experience in the MTA auction for personal communication services licenses 33. Bidding complexities in the combinatorial clock auction 34. Strategic bidding in combinatorial clock auctions - a bidder perspective 35. Impact of budget-contraints on the efficiency of multi-lot spectrum auctions Part VI. Secondary Markets and Exchanges: 36. Spectrum markets: motivation, challenges, and implications 37. Designing the US incentive auction 38. Solving the station repacking problem 39. ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange 40. ACE: a combinatorial market mechanism Outlook.
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