This step-by-step, self-contained introduction to the theory of auctions allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results in auction theory. Readers will work through the basic independent-private-model, understand the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue, develop a working knowledge of mechanism design, and be introduced to the theory of multi-object auctions.
This step-by-step, self-contained introduction to the theory of auctions allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results in auction theory. Readers will work through the basic independent-private-model, understand the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue, develop a working knowledge of mechanism design, and be introduced to the theory of multi-object auctions.
Professor Flavio Menezes is the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics at the ANU. He has published widely in economics of auctions and is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert. Flavio Menezes has extensive teaching experience in the areas of game theory, industrial organization, and on the theory of incentives. He has presented seminars and delivered lectures in the Americas, Europe, and the Asia Pacific Region, has lectured to both academic audiences and practitioners, and has rich consulting experience, including advising internationally on a privatisation model for utilities, providing advice on electricity regulatory reform, and reviewing government procurement practices. P. K. Monteiro received his PhD from IMPA in 1988. He has been at several institutions including UFRJ (1989-1993), IMPA (1994-1996, 1998-99), and EPGE-FGV (1999-present). He has been visiting fellow at CORE (1996-1997) and Copenhagen University (1997-1998). Monteiro works in General Equilibrium, Auction Theory, and Non-linear Pricing.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Introduction 2: Preliminaries 3: Private Values 4: Common Value 5: Affiliated Values 6: Mechanism Design 7: Multiple Objects A: Probability B: Differential Equations C: Affiliation D: Convexity References Index
