This bookconstitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 11th InternationalConference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015, held in Amsterdam, TheNetherlands, in December 2015. The 30 regular papers presented together with 8abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 142 submissions and coverresults on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science,artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.
This bookconstitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 11th InternationalConference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2015, held in Amsterdam, TheNetherlands, in December 2015. The 30 regular papers presented together with 8abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected from 142 submissions and coverresults on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science,artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations.- PriceCompetition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare.- ComputingStable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing.- The(Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments.- FastConvergence in the Double Oral Auction.- Minority Becomes Majority in SocialNetworks.- New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem.-Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators.- Computing Approximate NashEquilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing CostFunctions.- On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games.- ImpartialSelection and the Power of Up to Two Choices.- Online Allocation and Pricingwith Economies of Scale.- Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms.- TestingConsumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs.- Computation ofStackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games.- Welfare and RationalityGuarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction.- CombinatorialAuctions with Conflict-Based Externalities.- Applications of -strongly RegularDistributions to Bayesian Auctions.- The Curse of Sequentiality in RoutingGames.- Adaptive Rumor Spreading.- Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selectionfor Aggregative Games.- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium.- Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Briberyin CP-nets.- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players.- The VCG Mechanismfor Bayesian Scheduling.- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value ofMoney.- Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands.- Mechanisms with Monitoringfor Truthful RAM Allocation.- Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities inSuccinct Games.- Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.
Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations.- PriceCompetition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare.- ComputingStable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing.- The(Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments.- FastConvergence in the Double Oral Auction.- Minority Becomes Majority in SocialNetworks.- New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem.-Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators.- Computing Approximate NashEquilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing CostFunctions.- On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games.- ImpartialSelection and the Power of Up to Two Choices.- Online Allocation and Pricingwith Economies of Scale.- Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms.- TestingConsumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs.- Computation ofStackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games.- Welfare and RationalityGuarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction.- CombinatorialAuctions with Conflict-Based Externalities.- Applications of -strongly RegularDistributions to Bayesian Auctions.- The Curse of Sequentiality in RoutingGames.- Adaptive Rumor Spreading.- Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selectionfor Aggregative Games.- Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium.- Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Briberyin CP-nets.- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players.- The VCG Mechanismfor Bayesian Scheduling.- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value ofMoney.- Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands.- Mechanisms with Monitoringfor Truthful RAM Allocation.- Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities inSuccinct Games.- Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.
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