Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Comparative Evaluation of British and American Strategy in the Southern Campaign of 1780-1781]( "Comparative Evaluation of British and American Strategy in the Southern Campaign of 1780-1781")
Comparative Evaluation of British and American Strategy in the Southern Campaign of 1780-178159,99 €![New COIN of the Domestic Realm: How the Military Services Can Combine Emerging Warfare Doctrine with Innovative Methods of Interagency Coordination to]( "New COIN of the Domestic Realm: How the Military Services Can Combine Emerging Warfare Doctrine with Innovative Methods of Interagency Coordination to")
New COIN of the Domestic Realm: How the Military Services Can Combine Emerging Warfare Doctrine with Innovative Methods of Interagency Coordination to59,99 €![Army's Gambit: Dislocation Theory and the Development of Doctrine for the Interim Brigade Combat Team]( "Army's Gambit: Dislocation Theory and the Development of Doctrine for the Interim Brigade Combat Team")
Army's Gambit: Dislocation Theory and the Development of Doctrine for the Interim Brigade Combat Team59,99 €![Coin Goes Glocal: Traditional Coin with a Global Perspective: Does the Current Us Strategy Reflect Coin Theory, Doctrine and Principles?]( "Coin Goes Glocal: Traditional Coin with a Global Perspective: Does the Current Us Strategy Reflect Coin Theory, Doctrine and Principles?")
Coin Goes Glocal: Traditional Coin with a Global Perspective: Does the Current Us Strategy Reflect Coin Theory, Doctrine and Principles?59,99 €![United in Fact? A Critical Analysis of Intent and Perspective in the Application of American and British Army Doctrine]( "United in Fact? A Critical Analysis of Intent and Perspective in the Application of American and British Army Doctrine")
United in Fact? A Critical Analysis of Intent and Perspective in the Application of American and British Army Doctrine59,99 €![Leadership in Force XXI: Is The Army's Current Leadership Model and Leader Development Doctrine Properly Addressing the Challenges Brought Abou]( "Leadership in Force XXI: Is The Army's Current Leadership Model and Leader Development Doctrine Properly Addressing the Challenges Brought Abou")
Leadership in Force XXI: Is The Army's Current Leadership Model and Leader Development Doctrine Properly Addressing the Challenges Brought Abou59,99 €![Enemy We Were Fighting Was Not What We Had Predicted. What Is Wrong with Ipb at the Dawn of the 21st Century?]( "Enemy We Were Fighting Was Not What We Had Predicted. What Is Wrong with Ipb at the Dawn of the 21st Century?")
Enemy We Were Fighting Was Not What We Had Predicted. What Is Wrong with Ipb at the Dawn of the 21st Century?59,99 €
The purpose of this research was to obtain a historically rooted understanding of the development, application, and adaptation of the British COIN approach--one from which the US has borrowed heavily. It focuses upon those factors which interfere with timely, adaptive application of current COIN doctrine as soon as the warning signs of insurgency present themselves. The price of failing to do so in terms of blood and treasure has been widely proclaimed daily in the news media during the past decade of American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors on both sides of the Atlantic have already made much of the US Army's failure to capture COIN lessons from Vietnam and its abandonment of COIN education in its schools after the 1970s. For this reason, most American commanders went into Iraq with no doctrinal guide for COIN, a deficiency corrected only after painful reflection on the characteristics of the environment and the inefficacy of the conventional methods they initially employed. The British Army, on the other hand, went into Iraq with a COIN doctrine revised five times since the completion of its successful operations in Malaya, 1948-1960, including a version published only two years prior to entry into Iraq. Why did the British Army struggle with identifying insurgency and application of its own corresponding doctrine?