The Handbook of Market Design
Herausgeber: Vulkan, Nir; Neeman, Zvika; Roth, Alvin E
The Handbook of Market Design
Herausgeber: Vulkan, Nir; Neeman, Zvika; Roth, Alvin E
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This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
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This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Sydney University Press
- Seitenzahl: 720
- Erscheinungstermin: 22. Oktober 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 173mm x 48mm
- Gewicht: 1397g
- ISBN-13: 9780199570515
- ISBN-10: 0199570515
- Artikelnr.: 39338789
- Verlag: Sydney University Press
- Seitenzahl: 720
- Erscheinungstermin: 22. Oktober 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 173mm x 48mm
- Gewicht: 1397g
- ISBN-13: 9780199570515
- ISBN-10: 0199570515
- Artikelnr.: 39338789
Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998-2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Said Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of 'The Economics of E- Commerce' (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world. Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
* Introduction
* Part I: General Principles
* 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
* 2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for
Misbehavior
* 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
* Part II: Cases
* Section II.A: Matching Markets
* 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
* 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
* 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
* 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung
Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the
Job Market for Economists be Improved?
* 8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
* 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
* 10: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
* Section II.B: Auctions
* 11: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for
Differentiated Goods
* 12: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in
Core-Selecting Auctions
* 13: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough
Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati
Diamonds
* Section II.C: E Commerce
* 14: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet
Auctions: Design and Behavior
* 15: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of
Humans and Automated Agents
* 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial
Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of
Sourcing
* 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for
Communication Bandwith
* Section II.D: Law Design
* 18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to
Legal Problems
* 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with
Endogenous Preferences
* Part III: Experiments
* 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel
Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with
Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse
Auction
* 21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in
Auctions: An Experiment
* 22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments
* 23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the
Bill
* Part IV: Competing Designs
* 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
* 25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing
Designs in Financial Markets
* Part I: General Principles
* 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
* 2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for
Misbehavior
* 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
* Part II: Cases
* Section II.A: Matching Markets
* 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
* 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
* 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
* 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung
Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the
Job Market for Economists be Improved?
* 8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
* 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
* 10: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
* Section II.B: Auctions
* 11: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for
Differentiated Goods
* 12: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in
Core-Selecting Auctions
* 13: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough
Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati
Diamonds
* Section II.C: E Commerce
* 14: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet
Auctions: Design and Behavior
* 15: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of
Humans and Automated Agents
* 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial
Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of
Sourcing
* 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for
Communication Bandwith
* Section II.D: Law Design
* 18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to
Legal Problems
* 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with
Endogenous Preferences
* Part III: Experiments
* 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel
Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with
Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse
Auction
* 21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in
Auctions: An Experiment
* 22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments
* 23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the
Bill
* Part IV: Competing Designs
* 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
* 25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing
Designs in Financial Markets
* Introduction
* Part I: General Principles
* 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
* 2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for
Misbehavior
* 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
* Part II: Cases
* Section II.A: Matching Markets
* 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
* 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
* 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
* 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung
Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the
Job Market for Economists be Improved?
* 8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
* 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
* 10: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
* Section II.B: Auctions
* 11: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for
Differentiated Goods
* 12: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in
Core-Selecting Auctions
* 13: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough
Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati
Diamonds
* Section II.C: E Commerce
* 14: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet
Auctions: Design and Behavior
* 15: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of
Humans and Automated Agents
* 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial
Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of
Sourcing
* 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for
Communication Bandwith
* Section II.D: Law Design
* 18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to
Legal Problems
* 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with
Endogenous Preferences
* Part III: Experiments
* 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel
Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with
Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse
Auction
* 21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in
Auctions: An Experiment
* 22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments
* 23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the
Bill
* Part IV: Competing Designs
* 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
* 25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing
Designs in Financial Markets
* Part I: General Principles
* 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
* 2: Gary Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for
Misbehavior
* 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
* Part II: Cases
* Section II.A: Matching Markets
* 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
* 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
* 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
* 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung
Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the
Job Market for Economists be Improved?
* 8: Joshua Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
* 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
* 10: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
* Section II.B: Auctions
* 11: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: a New Auction Design for
Differentiated Goods
* 12: Paul Milgrom and Robert W. Day: Optimal Incentives in
Core-Selecting Auctions
* 13: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough
Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati
Diamonds
* Section II.C: E Commerce
* 14: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet
Auctions: Design and Behavior
* 15: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of
Humans and Automated Agents
* 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial
Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of
Sourcing
* 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for
Communication Bandwith
* Section II.D: Law Design
* 18: Zvika Neeman and Alon Klement: A Mechanism Design Approach to
Legal Problems
* 19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with
Endogenous Preferences
* Part III: Experiments
* 20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel
Higgins, Erkut Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with
Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse
Auction
* 21: Uri Gneezy and Martin Dufwenberg: Information Disclosure in
Auctions: An Experiment
* 22: Elena Katok: Buyer Determined Procurement Auctions Experiments
* 23: Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvey: The Inefficiency of Splitting the
Bill
* Part IV: Competing Designs
* 24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
* 25: Zvika Neeman and Nir Vulkan: Three Case Studies of Competing
Designs in Financial Markets