Web and Internet Economics (eBook, PDF)

14th International Conference, WINE 2018, Oxford, UK, December 15-17, 2018, Proceedings
Redaktion: Christodoulou, George; Harks, Tobias

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2018, held in Oxford, UK, in December 2018. The 28 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 119 submissions. The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and economics.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Springer-Verlag GmbH
• Seitenzahl: 454
• Erscheinungstermin: 3. Dezember 2018
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9783030046125
• Artikelnr.: 57008329

Inhaltsangabe

Ordinal Approximation for Social Choice, Matching, and Facility Location Problems Given Candidate Positions.- Infinite-Duration Poorman-Bidding Games.- Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models.- Strategy-Proof Incentives for Predictions.- Revealed Preference Dimension via Matrix Sign Rank.- Timing Matters: Online Dynamics in Broadcast Games.- A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer.- The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphs.-Approximating the Existential Theory of the Reals.- Pricing Multi-Unit Markets.- Optimal Pricing for MHR Distributions.- Learning Convex Partitions and Computing Game-theoretic Equilibria from Best Response Queries.- The Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy.- Equilibrium and Inefficiency in Multi-Product Cournot Games.- Combinatorial Assortment Optimization.- Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets.- Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations.- Social Welfare and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences.- Opinion Dynamics with Limited Information.- The Fair Division of Hereditary Set Systems.- Stable Marriage with Groups of Similar Agents.- Byzantine Preferential Voting.- Robust and Approximately Stable Marriages Under Partial Information.- Prophet Inequalities vs. Approximating Optimum Online.- Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-Loving Agents.- Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments.- Equilibria in Routing Games with Edge Priorities.- Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems.- How to Hide in a Network.- Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets.- Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts.- Markets for Public Decision-making.- Information Signal Design for Incentivizing Team Formation.- Revenue Management on an On-Demand Service Platform.- Implementing the Lexicographic Maxmin Bargaining Solution.- Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation.