Paul Schuler

United Front (eBook, ePUB)

Projecting Solidarity through Deliberation in Vietnam's Single-Party Legislature

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

Conventional wisdom emerging from China and other autocracies claims that single-party legislatures and elections are mutually beneficial for citizens and autocrats. This line of thought reasons that these institutions can serve multiple functions, like constraining political leaders or providing information about citizens. In United Front, Paul Schuler challenges these views through his examination of the past and present functioning of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), arguing that the legislature's primary role is to signal strength to the public. When active, the critical behavior from delegates in the legislature represents cross fire within the regime rather than genuine citizen feedback. In making these arguments, Schuler counters a growing scholarly trend to see democratic institutions within single-party settings like China and Vietnam as useful for citizens or regime performance. His argument also suggests that there are limits to generating genuinely "consultative authoritarianism" through quasi-democratic institutions. Applying a diverse range of cutting-edge social science methods on a wealth of original data such as legislative speeches, election returns, and surveys, Schuler shows that even in a seemingly vociferous legislature like the VNA, the ultimate purpose of the institution is not to reflect the views of citizens, but rather to signal the regime's preferences while taking down rivals.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 272
• Erscheinungstermin: 12. Januar 2021
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781503614758
• Artikelnr.: 60477113

Autorenporträt

Paul Schuler is Assistant Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
Introduction: Introduction
chapter abstract
The introduction presents the book's central research question and the
theory and evidence used to explore it: Why might the Vietnam National
Assembly and some single-party legislatures be empowered with greater
responsibilities and greater electoral competitiveness? Recent work
suggests that legislative institutionalization demonstrates "resilient" or
"consultative" authoritarianism, whereby autocrats can inform or constrain
themselves through limited debate in a legislature and limited electoral
competitiveness. This book challenges this view, arguing that single-party
legislatures and elections do not inform or constrain autocrats but instead
are meant to signal strength. When such legislatures are active, they are
supposed to direct their activity against the autocrat's agents in the
government. Elections serve to mobilize compliance with the regime. The
theory of this book suggests that autocrats cannot simultaneously encourage
input and signal strength through the same institutions. The introduction
concludes with a preview of the chapters.
1The Signaling Trap: Why Single-Party Legislatures Must Be Controlled
chapter abstract
This chapter examines existing explanations for the role of authoritarian
legislatures and elections, raising questions about the applicability of
these theories to Vietnam. It also lays out the book's core theoretical
argument that while autocrats may use institutions such as legislatures and
elections to achieve multiple goals, some goals are incompatible. In
particular, if autocrats hope to use legislatures and elections to signal
strength, this compromises their ability to use those same institutions to
constrain or inform themselves. The chapter then argues that autocrats in
single-party regimes are more likely to use legislatures and elections to
signal strength at the expense of constraint or information provision
because these institutions are publicly visible and state sanctioned. The
chapter concludes with the observable implications of the argument for
legislative organization, electoral behavior, delegate behavior, and public
opinion.
2How Elections Work in Vietnam
chapter abstract
This chapter lays out the structure of Vietnam's electoral system,
highlighting some of the key institutions that block linkages between
citizens and delegates. It focuses in particular on party management of
campaigns and vetting institutions to show how the "five gates" system
effectively keeps genuinely independent candidates from winning seats. The
chapter shows how the regime further undermines the competitiveness of
elections by manipulating the districts such that even candidates who
survive vetting face bias in favor of the regime's preferred candidates.
This chapter serves two purposes: providing important background on
Vietnam's electoral institutions, and highlighting important institutions
that facilitate the signaling value of elections and give the regime
control over legislative behavior.
3"Unconditional Party Government": Legislative Organization in the VNA
chapter abstract
This chapter examines legislative organization in the VNA, describing the
extremely hierarchical system as "unconditional party government." Building
from a theory of "conditional party government" to explain party control of
legislatures in democracies, this chapter describes the extreme dominance
of the VNA Standing Committee over legislative proceedings and agenda
setting. Given the party's role in deciding who will serve on the Standing
Committee and fill vital full-time roles in the legislature, the party
ensures its control over legislative output and the legislative agenda. As
with elections, party dominance of legislative output through the Standing
Committee ensures that the VNA serves to signal strength to the population
at the expense of the legislature's capacity to inform or constrain.
4Explaining the Evolution of the VNA
chapter abstract
This chapter explores the institutionalization of the VNA to examine the
argument that the Vietnam Communist Party empowered it to check the
government rather than to constrain or inform the party leadership. Before
defending this argument, which contradicts existing accounts of the
development of authoritarian legislatures and the VNA, the chapter also
establishes that the VNA is a most likely case for the competing arguments
for authoritarian legislative institutionalization and a least likely case
for the book's signaling argument. The chapter then defends the signaling
argument by examining the role party leaders played versus those of
political and economic reformers at critical moments when the legislature
gained increased powers. An examination of the decisions to empower the
legislature with greater staff, televised query sessions, and a regularized
vote of confidence measure shows that it was the party leaders who
supported the measures rather than economic liberalizers in the government.
5Mobilized or Motivated? Voting Behavior in Vietnamese Elections
chapter abstract
This chapter examines how electoral institutions impact electoral behavior
in a single-party regime. Existing work suggests that citizens in
authoritarian regimes vote in a partially informed manner and provide
information through their votes. By contrast, this chapter argues that
party strength rather than voter interest drives electoral behavior. Using
unique data from Vietnam, which for the first time combine actual electoral
returns with district-level survey data, this chapter shows little evidence
of strategic voting, competitiveness driving turnout, or knowledge of
candidates. Instead, connection to the party drives participation. The
findings imply that Vietnamese voters are ill informed about their
candidates and that their votes contain little informational content.
Consequently, elections are largely an exercise in mobilizing public
compliance and support for the party.
6Explaining Oversight Behavior: Position Taking or Position Ducking?
chapter abstract
This chapter examines legislative behavior in the VNA. The signaling and
blame deflection theory of the book holds that the legislature should not
criticize the party. By contrast, when the legislature is critical, it
should direct its attention toward government leaders. Using an original
dataset of public opinion data and legislative behavior, this chapter uses
automated text analysis to show that the VNA only debates hot-button issues
on government-controlled issues. When issues arise on party-controlled
portfolios, the legislature is not called into action. The findings imply
that the legislature does not primarily inform or constrain the party
through legislative behavior but rather serves to damage rivals in the
government.
7Intimidation or Legitimation? The Signaling Value of the VNA
chapter abstract
A final implication of the book's signaling theory is that legislative
behavior and elections should increase support for the party and reduce the
likelihood of public resistance. Such an effect could operate through two
potential channels. First, it could convince citizens that resistance is
futile. Alternatively, it could convince citizens more directly to support
the regime. Using an Internet-based survey experiment in Vietnam, this
chapter shows that legislative behavior and elections seem to boost public
confidence in the legitimacy of the legislature and the electoral process.
This in turn leads to greater support for the party and satisfaction in the
overall political environment in Vietnam.
Conclusion: Conclusion: Curbing our Expectations for the VNA, Single-Party
Legislatures
chapter abstract
The conclusion examines the implications of the theory and findings for
broader understanding of the role of legislatures in single-party and
hybrid regimes outside Vietnam. This chapter argues that while elections
for legislatures in hybrid regimes may be more informative than in
single-party contexts, the importance of legislatures for policy outcomes
is likely minimal in these contexts as well. The chapter then examines why
such legislatures have been associated with improved investment and
economic growth if they have little policy input. It suggests that one
reason is that legislative closures are typically correlated with the
process of consolidation, which hinders these outcomes. The chapter also
considers the implications of the argument for theories of democratization
and Vietnam's political development. It argues that while the VNA may
facilitate a smoother transition should democratization occur, the VNA and
other single-party legislatures are not likely to spearhead such a
transition.