Martin Kahn
The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II (eBook, PDF)
Economy, Society and Military Power
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Martin Kahn
The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II (eBook, PDF)
Economy, Society and Military Power
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This book examines how the two most important Western Allies in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom, assessed the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union in 1939-1945. Utilising a wide range of documents produced by the Anglo-Americans during and shortly before World War II, the book explores why Soviet strength was underestimated, and how the Soviet economic system, Soviet society and military capabilities were viewed by Western Government observers.
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This book examines how the two most important Western Allies in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom, assessed the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union in 1939-1945. Utilising a wide range of documents produced by the Anglo-Americans during and shortly before World War II, the book explores why Soviet strength was underestimated, and how the Soviet economic system, Soviet society and military capabilities were viewed by Western Government observers.
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Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 356
- Erscheinungstermin: 27. März 2017
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9781317403975
- Artikelnr.: 48114434
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 356
- Erscheinungstermin: 27. März 2017
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9781317403975
- Artikelnr.: 48114434
Martin Kahn is a Swedish economic historian. He is a docent (associate professor) affiliated with the Department of Economy and Society at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 General background
1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study
2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context
2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing
the USSR
2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information
2.3 The assessment's reliability and the selection of reports for this
study
2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential
3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international
Great Power politics before World War II
4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact
4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the
"gathering storm" in Europe
4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a "peace
front"
4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance
4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations
5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments
5.1 The economy and its military potential
5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces
5.3 Internal stability
6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences
6.1 The Polish campaign
6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary
6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia
6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn
6.5 Soviet air strength - autumn assessments
6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet-Japanese conflict
6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply
7 The Soviet-Finnish Winter War
7.1 The Red Army's performance
7.2 The economy and the internal situation
8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa
8.1 The economy and internal stability
8.2 The production and quality of munitions
8.3 Military efficiency and the size of the armed forces
9 The nature of the assessments, and the "reality"
10 The beginning of Soviet-German war: Assessments during Operation
Barbarossa
10.1 The border battles and the summer: German victories and the
possibility of a Soviet collapse
10.2 The Soviet economy under attack (and Soviet prospects)
10.3 The autumn 1941 situation
10.4 Munitions
10.5 The Armed Forces and their efficiency
11 The first turning point of the war: the Soviet winter offensive
12 The spring, the coming of summer and continued worries
12.1 Soviet prospects and economic resilience
12.2 The Soviet population and the war effort
12.3 The Red Army and its munitions
13 The first year of the Soviet-German war: how realistic were the
assessments?
14 The German summer offensive and Soviet prospects
15 The Anglo-American assessments in the context of the possibility to
establish a Second Front in 1942
16 The autumn assessments and the battle of Stalingrad
16.1 Prospects and civilian morale
16.2 The economic situation
16.3 Food supply
16.4 The manpower situation
16.5 Munitions
16.6 The size of the armed forces and military losses
16.7 Military efficiency and morale
17 From Stalingrad to Kursk
17.1 Military prospects, internal stability and civilian support for the
war effort
17.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
17.3 Munitions
17.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
17.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
18 The 1943 cross-channel attack that never was and the "90-division
gamble"
19 The Red Army's first major push to the West
19.1 Soviet military prospects, civilian morale and internal stability
19.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
19.3 Munitions: output and quality
19.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
19.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
20 The final phase of the war: from Operation Bagration to the surrender of
Germany (and the campaign against Japan)
20.1 Soviet military prospects and internal stability
20.2 The economy and reconstruction
20.3 The population, the labour force, food supply and civilian life
20.4 The production and efficiency of munitions and military equipment
20.5 The size of the armed forces, losses and military efficiency
20.6 Why the USSR won the war (according to the Military Mission's final
report)
21 Assessments compared to reality during the last period of the war 305
22 The assessments of war potential and material aid to the USSR 312
23 A comment on the assessments in the context of the early Cold War
24 Conclusion
References
Index
1 Introduction
1.1 General background
1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study
2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context
2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing
the USSR
2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information
2.3 The assessment's reliability and the selection of reports for this
study
2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential
3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international
Great Power politics before World War II
4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact
4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the
"gathering storm" in Europe
4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a "peace
front"
4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance
4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations
5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments
5.1 The economy and its military potential
5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces
5.3 Internal stability
6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences
6.1 The Polish campaign
6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary
6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia
6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn
6.5 Soviet air strength - autumn assessments
6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet-Japanese conflict
6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply
7 The Soviet-Finnish Winter War
7.1 The Red Army's performance
7.2 The economy and the internal situation
8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa
8.1 The economy and internal stability
8.2 The production and quality of munitions
8.3 Military efficiency and the size of the armed forces
9 The nature of the assessments, and the "reality"
10 The beginning of Soviet-German war: Assessments during Operation
Barbarossa
10.1 The border battles and the summer: German victories and the
possibility of a Soviet collapse
10.2 The Soviet economy under attack (and Soviet prospects)
10.3 The autumn 1941 situation
10.4 Munitions
10.5 The Armed Forces and their efficiency
11 The first turning point of the war: the Soviet winter offensive
12 The spring, the coming of summer and continued worries
12.1 Soviet prospects and economic resilience
12.2 The Soviet population and the war effort
12.3 The Red Army and its munitions
13 The first year of the Soviet-German war: how realistic were the
assessments?
14 The German summer offensive and Soviet prospects
15 The Anglo-American assessments in the context of the possibility to
establish a Second Front in 1942
16 The autumn assessments and the battle of Stalingrad
16.1 Prospects and civilian morale
16.2 The economic situation
16.3 Food supply
16.4 The manpower situation
16.5 Munitions
16.6 The size of the armed forces and military losses
16.7 Military efficiency and morale
17 From Stalingrad to Kursk
17.1 Military prospects, internal stability and civilian support for the
war effort
17.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
17.3 Munitions
17.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
17.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
18 The 1943 cross-channel attack that never was and the "90-division
gamble"
19 The Red Army's first major push to the West
19.1 Soviet military prospects, civilian morale and internal stability
19.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
19.3 Munitions: output and quality
19.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
19.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
20 The final phase of the war: from Operation Bagration to the surrender of
Germany (and the campaign against Japan)
20.1 Soviet military prospects and internal stability
20.2 The economy and reconstruction
20.3 The population, the labour force, food supply and civilian life
20.4 The production and efficiency of munitions and military equipment
20.5 The size of the armed forces, losses and military efficiency
20.6 Why the USSR won the war (according to the Military Mission's final
report)
21 Assessments compared to reality during the last period of the war 305
22 The assessments of war potential and material aid to the USSR 312
23 A comment on the assessments in the context of the early Cold War
24 Conclusion
References
Index
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 General background
1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study
2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context
2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing
the USSR
2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information
2.3 The assessment's reliability and the selection of reports for this
study
2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential
3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international
Great Power politics before World War II
4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact
4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the
"gathering storm" in Europe
4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a "peace
front"
4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance
4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations
5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments
5.1 The economy and its military potential
5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces
5.3 Internal stability
6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences
6.1 The Polish campaign
6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary
6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia
6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn
6.5 Soviet air strength - autumn assessments
6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet-Japanese conflict
6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply
7 The Soviet-Finnish Winter War
7.1 The Red Army's performance
7.2 The economy and the internal situation
8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa
8.1 The economy and internal stability
8.2 The production and quality of munitions
8.3 Military efficiency and the size of the armed forces
9 The nature of the assessments, and the "reality"
10 The beginning of Soviet-German war: Assessments during Operation
Barbarossa
10.1 The border battles and the summer: German victories and the
possibility of a Soviet collapse
10.2 The Soviet economy under attack (and Soviet prospects)
10.3 The autumn 1941 situation
10.4 Munitions
10.5 The Armed Forces and their efficiency
11 The first turning point of the war: the Soviet winter offensive
12 The spring, the coming of summer and continued worries
12.1 Soviet prospects and economic resilience
12.2 The Soviet population and the war effort
12.3 The Red Army and its munitions
13 The first year of the Soviet-German war: how realistic were the
assessments?
14 The German summer offensive and Soviet prospects
15 The Anglo-American assessments in the context of the possibility to
establish a Second Front in 1942
16 The autumn assessments and the battle of Stalingrad
16.1 Prospects and civilian morale
16.2 The economic situation
16.3 Food supply
16.4 The manpower situation
16.5 Munitions
16.6 The size of the armed forces and military losses
16.7 Military efficiency and morale
17 From Stalingrad to Kursk
17.1 Military prospects, internal stability and civilian support for the
war effort
17.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
17.3 Munitions
17.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
17.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
18 The 1943 cross-channel attack that never was and the "90-division
gamble"
19 The Red Army's first major push to the West
19.1 Soviet military prospects, civilian morale and internal stability
19.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
19.3 Munitions: output and quality
19.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
19.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
20 The final phase of the war: from Operation Bagration to the surrender of
Germany (and the campaign against Japan)
20.1 Soviet military prospects and internal stability
20.2 The economy and reconstruction
20.3 The population, the labour force, food supply and civilian life
20.4 The production and efficiency of munitions and military equipment
20.5 The size of the armed forces, losses and military efficiency
20.6 Why the USSR won the war (according to the Military Mission's final
report)
21 Assessments compared to reality during the last period of the war 305
22 The assessments of war potential and material aid to the USSR 312
23 A comment on the assessments in the context of the early Cold War
24 Conclusion
References
Index
1 Introduction
1.1 General background
1.2 War potential and the general purpose of this study
2 The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context
2.1 The US and British government organizations responsible for assessing
the USSR
2.2 The origins, analysis and dissemination of information
2.3 The assessment's reliability and the selection of reports for this
study
2.4 The reality and contemporary perceptions of war potential
3 The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international
Great Power politics before World War II
4 From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact
4.1 British anguish: The value of the Soviet Union as an ally and the
"gathering storm" in Europe
4.2 Soviet war potential and the possible inclusion of the USSR in a "peace
front"
4.3 The Soviets propose an alliance
4.4 Assessments on the eve of the Moscow negotiations
5 US pre-Barbarossa assessments
5.1 The economy and its military potential
5.2 The size and efficiency of the armed forces
5.3 Internal stability
6 The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences
6.1 The Polish campaign
6.2 The USSR as a potential military adversary
6.3 The Red Army enter Estonia
6.4 Assessments regarding the economy during the autumn
6.5 Soviet air strength - autumn assessments
6.6 Assessments connected to the Soviet-Japanese conflict
6.7 Anglo-French plans to interdict the Soviet oil supply
7 The Soviet-Finnish Winter War
7.1 The Red Army's performance
7.2 The economy and the internal situation
8 Assessments running up to Barbarossa
8.1 The economy and internal stability
8.2 The production and quality of munitions
8.3 Military efficiency and the size of the armed forces
9 The nature of the assessments, and the "reality"
10 The beginning of Soviet-German war: Assessments during Operation
Barbarossa
10.1 The border battles and the summer: German victories and the
possibility of a Soviet collapse
10.2 The Soviet economy under attack (and Soviet prospects)
10.3 The autumn 1941 situation
10.4 Munitions
10.5 The Armed Forces and their efficiency
11 The first turning point of the war: the Soviet winter offensive
12 The spring, the coming of summer and continued worries
12.1 Soviet prospects and economic resilience
12.2 The Soviet population and the war effort
12.3 The Red Army and its munitions
13 The first year of the Soviet-German war: how realistic were the
assessments?
14 The German summer offensive and Soviet prospects
15 The Anglo-American assessments in the context of the possibility to
establish a Second Front in 1942
16 The autumn assessments and the battle of Stalingrad
16.1 Prospects and civilian morale
16.2 The economic situation
16.3 Food supply
16.4 The manpower situation
16.5 Munitions
16.6 The size of the armed forces and military losses
16.7 Military efficiency and morale
17 From Stalingrad to Kursk
17.1 Military prospects, internal stability and civilian support for the
war effort
17.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
17.3 Munitions
17.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
17.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
18 The 1943 cross-channel attack that never was and the "90-division
gamble"
19 The Red Army's first major push to the West
19.1 Soviet military prospects, civilian morale and internal stability
19.2 The economy, manpower, food supply and civilian living conditions
19.3 Munitions: output and quality
19.4 The size of the armed forces and the military mobilization
19.5 The morale, efficiency and losses of the armed forces
20 The final phase of the war: from Operation Bagration to the surrender of
Germany (and the campaign against Japan)
20.1 Soviet military prospects and internal stability
20.2 The economy and reconstruction
20.3 The population, the labour force, food supply and civilian life
20.4 The production and efficiency of munitions and military equipment
20.5 The size of the armed forces, losses and military efficiency
20.6 Why the USSR won the war (according to the Military Mission's final
report)
21 Assessments compared to reality during the last period of the war 305
22 The assessments of war potential and material aid to the USSR 312
23 A comment on the assessments in the context of the early Cold War
24 Conclusion
References
Index