Donald W. Hamilton

The Art of Insurgency (eBook, PDF)

American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc
• Seitenzahl: 216
• Altersempfehlung: ab 7 Jahre
• Erscheinungstermin: 26. Januar 1998
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781573568548
• Artikelnr.: 37973606

Autorenporträt

DONALD W. HAMILTON is Professor of History at Mesa College and serves as a reserve officer in the U.S. military.

Inhaltsangabe

Foreword Preface Illustrations Maps List of Abbreviations Figures
Insurgency and American Military Doctrine: An Introduction Explaining
Insurgency An Analysis of Two Postwar Asian Insurgencies The First
Vietnamese Insurgency, 1945-1954 Seeds of American Commitment The Second
Vietnamese Insurgency: Phase I The Second Vietnamese Insurgency: Phase II
Secondary Insurgency and the American Reaction Summary Notes on Lessons of
a Failed Strategy Selected Bibliography Index