Max Abrahms

Rules for Rebels (eBook, PDF)

The Science of Victory in Militant History

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

Ever wonder why militant groups behave as they do? For instance, why did Al Qaeda attack the World Trade Center whereas the African National Congress tried to avoid civilian bloodshed? Why does Islamic State brag over social media about its gory attacks, while Hezbollah denies responsibility or even apologizes for its carnage? This book shows that militant group behaviour depends on the tactical intelligence of the leaders. The author has extensively studied the political plights of hundreds of militant groups throughout world history and reveals that successful militant leaders have followed three rules. These rules are based on original insights from the fields of political science, psychology, criminology, economics, management, marketing, communication, and sociology. It turns out there?s a science to victory in militant history. But even rebels must follow rules.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 296
• Erscheinungstermin: 4. September 2018
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780192539434
• Artikelnr.: 54594773

Autorenporträt

Dr. Max Abrahms is among the worlds leading experts on the subject of terrorism. Currently, he is a professor of political science and public policy at Northeastern University. He has held various affiliations with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, the Empirical Studies of Conflict project at Princeton University and Stanford University, the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University, the Center for the Study of Terrorism in Rome, the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, the economics department at Bar Ilan University, the political science department at Johns Hopkins University, and the Belfer Center at Harvard University.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction: The Stupid Terrorist
Rule #1
1. Learning to Win
1: My West Bank Discovery
2: Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism
3: Terrorism Success Stories Revisited
4: Correspondence of Means and Ends Bias
5: How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise
6: What Smart Leaders Know
Rule #2
2. Restraining to Win
7: Principal-Agent Problems in Militant Groups
8: Cultivating Task Cohesion
9: The Structure of Success
10: The Benefits of Centralizing
11: When Elephants Rampage
Rule #3
3. Branding to Win
12: Denial of Organizational Involvement
13: Denial of Principal Intent
Conclusion: The Future of Terrorism