Alessio Pacces

Rethinking Corporate Governance (eBook, PDF)

The Law and Economics of Control Powers

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

This book reappraises the existing framework for the economic analysis of corporate law, based on three categories of private benefits of control. Analyzed in the US, UK, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands, these benefits of control include the distribution of corporate powers, self-dealing, and takeover regulation. Not only does this approach to corporate law explain separation of ownership and control better than investor protection alone, it also suggests that the law can improve the efficiency of corporate governance by reducing the potential power of non-controlling shareholders.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis
• Seitenzahl: 496
• Erscheinungstermin: 17. Januar 2013
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781135099428
• Artikelnr.: 42828325

Autorenporträt

Alessio M. Pacces is Professor of Law and Finance at the Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam and since 2009 he has been a Research Associate of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). Before joining academia, Professor Pacces was a senior researcher in the Law and Economics Research Department of the Bank of Italy, a financial economist at the Italian Securities Authority (Consob), and he served as junior officer in the Italian Financial Police. His research is mainly concerned with the economic analysis of corporate law and of financial regulation.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction 1. Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence 2. Private
Benefits of Control 3. The Law and Economics of Control Powers: A
theoretical Framework 4. Legal Distribution of Corporate Powers 5. How to
Cope with Self-Dealing 6. Regulation of Related-Party Transactions: A
Comparative Analysis 7. Takeovers: Law and Economics 8. Comparative
Takeover Law 9. Concluding Remarks