David B. Wong

Moral Relativism and Pluralism (eBook, PDF)

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The argument for this view features a comparison between traditions that highly value relationship and community and traditions that highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual. The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting and abortion.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 25. Januar 2023
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781009050135
• Artikelnr.: 68994604

Inhaltsangabe

1. Why are people so exercised about moral relativism?; 2. How should
theses about moral relativism be framed?; 3. Relationship and community,
autonomy and rights; 4. Epistemic reasons to delve further into the
conflict between relationship-centered and rights-centered moralities; 5.
An ethical argument for extended inquiry into rivals to one's own ethical
views; 6. Overcoming stereotypes of relationship-centered moralities; 7.
Complicating the contrast between relationship and autonomy -centered
moralities; 8. The underdiscussed question of what morality is; 9. A
naturalistic approach to understanding why human beings have moralities;
10. Putting together moral ambivalence and a naturalistic conception of
morality; 11. Constraints on the range of viable moralities; 12. The social
construction of morality: by the individual or group?; 13. When people
differ in their moral beliefs about an issue, when do they actually
disagree?; 14. Why we have different beliefs in metaethics; 15. How moral
reasons enter into the truth conditions of moral judgments help shape our
moral motivations; 16. Summary of the argument for a pluralistic form of
metaethical moral relativism; 17. Confused reasoning that is sometimes
attributed to those who believe in normative moral relativism; 18. An
argument for normative moral relativism that is contingent upon the
acceptance of certain values and the adoption of metaethical moral
relativism; 19. Why normative moral relativism cannot be a simple matter of
letting others be; 20. What is female genital cutting?; 21. Accommodation
and the fraught issue of abortion; 22. Undermining stereotypes of the other
side; 23. Fostering pluralistic encounters; 24. Summary of normative moral
relativism.