China's Futures (eBook, ePUB)
PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics, and Foreign Policy
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China's Futures (eBook, ePUB)
PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics, and Foreign Policy
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China's Futures cuts through the sometimes confounding and unfounded speculation of international pundits and commentators to provide readers with an important yet overlooked set of complex views concerning China's future: views originating within China itself. Daniel Lynch seeks to answer the simple but rarely asked question: how do China's own leaders and other elite figures assess their country's future? Many Western social scientists, business leaders, journalists, technocrats, analysts, and policymakers convey confident predictions about the future of China's rise. Every day, the…mehr
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- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 352
- Erscheinungstermin: 11. März 2015
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9780804794374
- Artikelnr.: 48416970
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 352
- Erscheinungstermin: 11. März 2015
- Englisch
- ISBN-13: 9780804794374
- Artikelnr.: 48416970
1The Pitfalls of Rationalist Predictioneering
chapter abstract
Social scientists and public intellectuals-including in the media
commentariat-are fond of making predictions. Their audiences seems to
demand it. Nowhere is this phenomenon more visible than in the case of
rising China. But the cross-disciplinary "futures studies" subfield linking
social scientists with historians argues cogently that predictioneering is
a doomed enterprise with real-world negative consequences such as bad
public policy. Chapter 1 explains the three core correctives analysts in
this subfield argue should be used to delimit or reshape predictioneering.
Many of these analysts stress that much more attention should be given to
what a society's own elites imagine their country's future to hold: their
images of the future. Images can act as powerful causal factors or
"attractors" pulling the country in sometimes different directions.
Understanding this perspective is essential to thinking more carefully and
productively about the future of China's rise.
2Economic Growth: Marching Into a Middle-Income Trap?
chapter abstract
When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) put into place an enormous monetary stimulus program which created
the impression that China avoided the crisis and emerged stronger than
almost any other country. Countless foreign commentators echoed such
sentiments in the media and on the Internet. However, all along Chinese
economists were exposing serious problems with China's economy and were
harshly criticizing the CCP for allowing these problems to worsen. Chinese
economists declined to praise the 2008-2009 stimulus program; they
denounced it vociferously. Almost unanimously, the Chinese economists now
express alarm that the parlous economic situation will interact with
deleterious demographic trends to usher China into a middle-income trap. If
this results, China's rise will cease.
3The Leninist Political System Confronts a Pluralistic, Wealthy Society
chapter abstract
Almost all Chinese political scientists and commentators recognize that
China has become an overwhelmingly more pluralistic, wealthy society since
reform and opening began in the late 1970s, and especially during the past
decade. While some who hope for and expect eventual democratization think
that the state should first tighten control over society in order to combat
corruption and crack down on crime-because democracy cannot flourish when
inequality is widespread and people are bitter at visible injustice-others
think that only by increasing transparency and accountability starting now
can corruption, pollution, and the myriad other phenomena that make Chinese
citizens angry be addressed effectively. Meanwhile, certain neo-Leftist
nationalists completely reject democratization as a legitimate or sensible
objective. They worry that democratization would lead to the country's
dismemberment, followed by its permanent subjugation to the West.
4The New Frontier: Changing Communication Patterns and China's
Transformation into a "Network Society"
chapter abstract
400 million or so Chinese people who have access to the Internet, either by
computer or some other device. The network society affects the functioning
of the economy, politics, and administration; politically and
administratively, it forces CCP leaders and the bureaucrats they supervise
either to become more responsive to public demands or else think of clever
new ways to manipulate what citizens think and perceive. For some Chinese
social scientists and propaganda officials who specialize in studying
communications, transformation into a network society heralds China's
eventual democratization and should be encouraged and creatively promoted.
For others, it suggests the return of a nightmarishly Hobbesian, Cultural
Revolution-like public sphere, only this time with the battles raging
mostly through telecommunications circuits. Their debate with the optimists
is intense, suggesting that the stakes in this issue-area are higher than
perhaps outsiders fully appreciate.
5China's Rise: Irreversibly Reconfiguring International Relations?
chapter abstract
The most prominent prediction among (Western) international relations
specialists is that China's rise will precipitate serious conflict between
China and the United States, stemming from the logic of "power transition
theory." In contrast, China's own international relations specialists tend
to imagine the power transition leading not to war but instead to China's
glorious (and peaceful) recentering in international relations and world
history-reflecting what they consider to be China's natural and rightful
world-historical destiny. Certainly among the minority of prominent Chinese
IR specialists who do read the economists and who are concerned that the
success of the rise is not inevitable, a misguided and dangerous hubris is
cited as the main reason for the foreign policy shift, which these moderate
IR specialists find troubling.
6Competing with the West on the "Cultural Front" in International Relations
chapter abstract
Not only strategically and economically, but also culturally, Chinese IR
specialists-almost to a person-imagine China as being in a contest or even
struggle with the West to increase influence or "discourse power" for the
purpose of shaping decision-making in other countries and directing the
course of world development. Unlike in the case of material (economic and
military) competition, Chinese IR specialists are sharply divided on the
likely outcome of the cultural competition. The result is that some Chinese
specialists-including in the People's Liberation Army-present the West as a
menacingly dangerous, subversive cultural threat to China that only massive
investment in the culture and information industries could ever possibly
counter. Throughout the world, almost everyone wants to resist American
cultural hegemony, the thinking goes. China is the only country with the
power, respect, and sincerely ethical values to help.
7China: Unstoppably Rising, or Perched on the Edge of a Crisis?
chapter abstract
The most striking finding of this research is that there are "two Chinas"
in the minds of Chinese elite analysts; that is, there are two dramatically
different Chinese futures. The first future is the one generally expected
in the outside world: that of China continuing inexorably to rise, albeit
facing (but handling) occasional bumps in the road. In this view, China's
rise is just as inevitable as was Japan's from the perspective of 1980. It
is the view held by the majority of Chinese international relations
analysts, including those in the PLA-and the more assertive or aggressive
foreign policy since 2009 would seem to indicate the view is also shared by
the CCP's top foreign policy strategists.
1The Pitfalls of Rationalist Predictioneering
chapter abstract
Social scientists and public intellectuals-including in the media
commentariat-are fond of making predictions. Their audiences seems to
demand it. Nowhere is this phenomenon more visible than in the case of
rising China. But the cross-disciplinary "futures studies" subfield linking
social scientists with historians argues cogently that predictioneering is
a doomed enterprise with real-world negative consequences such as bad
public policy. Chapter 1 explains the three core correctives analysts in
this subfield argue should be used to delimit or reshape predictioneering.
Many of these analysts stress that much more attention should be given to
what a society's own elites imagine their country's future to hold: their
images of the future. Images can act as powerful causal factors or
"attractors" pulling the country in sometimes different directions.
Understanding this perspective is essential to thinking more carefully and
productively about the future of China's rise.
2Economic Growth: Marching Into a Middle-Income Trap?
chapter abstract
When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) put into place an enormous monetary stimulus program which created
the impression that China avoided the crisis and emerged stronger than
almost any other country. Countless foreign commentators echoed such
sentiments in the media and on the Internet. However, all along Chinese
economists were exposing serious problems with China's economy and were
harshly criticizing the CCP for allowing these problems to worsen. Chinese
economists declined to praise the 2008-2009 stimulus program; they
denounced it vociferously. Almost unanimously, the Chinese economists now
express alarm that the parlous economic situation will interact with
deleterious demographic trends to usher China into a middle-income trap. If
this results, China's rise will cease.
3The Leninist Political System Confronts a Pluralistic, Wealthy Society
chapter abstract
Almost all Chinese political scientists and commentators recognize that
China has become an overwhelmingly more pluralistic, wealthy society since
reform and opening began in the late 1970s, and especially during the past
decade. While some who hope for and expect eventual democratization think
that the state should first tighten control over society in order to combat
corruption and crack down on crime-because democracy cannot flourish when
inequality is widespread and people are bitter at visible injustice-others
think that only by increasing transparency and accountability starting now
can corruption, pollution, and the myriad other phenomena that make Chinese
citizens angry be addressed effectively. Meanwhile, certain neo-Leftist
nationalists completely reject democratization as a legitimate or sensible
objective. They worry that democratization would lead to the country's
dismemberment, followed by its permanent subjugation to the West.
4The New Frontier: Changing Communication Patterns and China's
Transformation into a "Network Society"
chapter abstract
400 million or so Chinese people who have access to the Internet, either by
computer or some other device. The network society affects the functioning
of the economy, politics, and administration; politically and
administratively, it forces CCP leaders and the bureaucrats they supervise
either to become more responsive to public demands or else think of clever
new ways to manipulate what citizens think and perceive. For some Chinese
social scientists and propaganda officials who specialize in studying
communications, transformation into a network society heralds China's
eventual democratization and should be encouraged and creatively promoted.
For others, it suggests the return of a nightmarishly Hobbesian, Cultural
Revolution-like public sphere, only this time with the battles raging
mostly through telecommunications circuits. Their debate with the optimists
is intense, suggesting that the stakes in this issue-area are higher than
perhaps outsiders fully appreciate.
5China's Rise: Irreversibly Reconfiguring International Relations?
chapter abstract
The most prominent prediction among (Western) international relations
specialists is that China's rise will precipitate serious conflict between
China and the United States, stemming from the logic of "power transition
theory." In contrast, China's own international relations specialists tend
to imagine the power transition leading not to war but instead to China's
glorious (and peaceful) recentering in international relations and world
history-reflecting what they consider to be China's natural and rightful
world-historical destiny. Certainly among the minority of prominent Chinese
IR specialists who do read the economists and who are concerned that the
success of the rise is not inevitable, a misguided and dangerous hubris is
cited as the main reason for the foreign policy shift, which these moderate
IR specialists find troubling.
6Competing with the West on the "Cultural Front" in International Relations
chapter abstract
Not only strategically and economically, but also culturally, Chinese IR
specialists-almost to a person-imagine China as being in a contest or even
struggle with the West to increase influence or "discourse power" for the
purpose of shaping decision-making in other countries and directing the
course of world development. Unlike in the case of material (economic and
military) competition, Chinese IR specialists are sharply divided on the
likely outcome of the cultural competition. The result is that some Chinese
specialists-including in the People's Liberation Army-present the West as a
menacingly dangerous, subversive cultural threat to China that only massive
investment in the culture and information industries could ever possibly
counter. Throughout the world, almost everyone wants to resist American
cultural hegemony, the thinking goes. China is the only country with the
power, respect, and sincerely ethical values to help.
7China: Unstoppably Rising, or Perched on the Edge of a Crisis?
chapter abstract
The most striking finding of this research is that there are "two Chinas"
in the minds of Chinese elite analysts; that is, there are two dramatically
different Chinese futures. The first future is the one generally expected
in the outside world: that of China continuing inexorably to rise, albeit
facing (but handling) occasional bumps in the road. In this view, China's
rise is just as inevitable as was Japan's from the perspective of 1980. It
is the view held by the majority of Chinese international relations
analysts, including those in the PLA-and the more assertive or aggressive
foreign policy since 2009 would seem to indicate the view is also shared by
the CCP's top foreign policy strategists.