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Conventional wisdom says that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) functions as the de facto international lender of last resort (ILLR) for the global financial system. However, that premise is incomplete. Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how the U.S. has for decades regularly complemented the Fund's ILLR role by selectively providing billions of dollars in emergency loans to foreign economies in crisis. Why would the U.S. ever put national financial resources at risk to "bail out" foreign countries? McDowell argues that the U.S. has been compelled to provide such rescues…mehr
Conventional wisdom says that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) functions as the de facto international lender of last resort (ILLR) for the global financial system. However, that premise is incomplete. Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? explores how the U.S. has for decades regularly complemented the Fund's ILLR role by selectively providing billions of dollars in emergency loans to foreign economies in crisis. Why would the U.S. ever put national financial resources at risk to "bail out" foreign countries? McDowell argues that the U.S. has been compelled to provide such rescues unilaterally when it believes the IMF's multilateral response is too slow or too small to protect vital U.S. economic interests. Through a combination of historical case studies and statistical analysis, McDowell uncovers the defensive motives behind U.S. decisions to provide global liquidity from the 1960s through the 2008 global financial crisis. Moving beyond conventional wisdom, this book paints a complete picture of how international financial crises have been managed and highlights the unique role the U.S. has played in stabilizing the world economy in troubled times.
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Daniel McDowell is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. His work has been published in International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Organizations, and New Political Economy.
Inhaltsangabe
* Table of Contents * Table of Figures * Table of Tables * Preface * List of Abbreviations * CHAPTER 1 - Introduction * 1. THE PUZZLE * 2. THE ARGUMENT * 3. PLAN OF THE BOOK and FINDINGS * CHAPTER 2 - The ILLR in Theory and Practice * 1. AN INTERNATIONAL LLR: A BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONCEPT * 1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon * 1.2 The ILLR and the IMF * 2. THE IMF'S LIMITATIONS AS ILLR * 2.1. The Problem of Unresponsiveness * 2.2. The Problem of Resource Insufficiency * 3. THE UNITED STATES' ILLR MECHANISMS * 3.1. The Mechanics of Currency Swaps * 3.2. Speed and Independence * 3.3. Lending Capacity * 3.4. Division of Labor * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 3 - The United States Invents its Own ILLR, 1961-1962 * 1. MORE DOLLARS, MORE PROBLEMS * 1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut * 1.2. Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation * 2. IN SEARCH OF AN ILLR * 2.1. The General Arrangements to Borrow * 3. AN ALTERNATIVE ILLR: CENTRAL BANK CURRENCY SWAPS * 3.1. The Fed's Novel Idea * 3.2. Who Needs the IMF? * 3.3. How the Swap Lines Protected U.S. Interests * 3.4. Why did Europe Cooperate? * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 4 - The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s * 1. THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND * 2. 1980s: GLOBAL BANKING AND THE DEBT CRISIS * 2.1. The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness * 2.2. The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness * 3. 1990s: PORTFOLIO FLOWS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES * 3.1. Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency * 3.2. The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 5 - Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bailout, 1983-1999 * 1. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND ESF BAILOUT SELECTION * 2. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ESF BAILOUT SELECTION * 3. RESULTS * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 6 - U.S. International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s * 1. CASE SELECTION * 2. THE CASES * 2.1. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 1982-1983 * 2.2. Argentina, 1984 * 2.3. Poland, 1989 * 2.4. Mexico, 1995 * 2.5. Thailand, 1997 * 2.6. Indonesia and South Korea, 1997 * 2.7. Declining Use: The ESF is Put Out to Pasture * 3. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 7 - The United States as ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008-2009 * 1. BACKGROUND: "A NOVEL ASPECT" OF THE GREAT PANIC OF 2008 * 2. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS * 3. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FED SWAP LINE SELECTION * 4. THE INTEREST RATE THREAT AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS * 5. TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF FOMC MEETINGS * 5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007 - December 2007 * 5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008 - August 2008 * 5.3. Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008 - October 28, 2008 * 5.4. Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008 * 6. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 8 - Conclusions * 1. CONTRIBUTIONS * 2. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AS ILLR * 3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS * 4. FINAL THOUGHTS * BIBLIOGRAPHY * APPENDIX
* Table of Contents * Table of Figures * Table of Tables * Preface * List of Abbreviations * CHAPTER 1 - Introduction * 1. THE PUZZLE * 2. THE ARGUMENT * 3. PLAN OF THE BOOK and FINDINGS * CHAPTER 2 - The ILLR in Theory and Practice * 1. AN INTERNATIONAL LLR: A BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONCEPT * 1.1 The ILLR and the Hegemon * 1.2 The ILLR and the IMF * 2. THE IMF'S LIMITATIONS AS ILLR * 2.1. The Problem of Unresponsiveness * 2.2. The Problem of Resource Insufficiency * 3. THE UNITED STATES' ILLR MECHANISMS * 3.1. The Mechanics of Currency Swaps * 3.2. Speed and Independence * 3.3. Lending Capacity * 3.4. Division of Labor * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 3 - The United States Invents its Own ILLR, 1961-1962 * 1. MORE DOLLARS, MORE PROBLEMS * 1.1 From Dollar Gap to Dollar Glut * 1.2. Two Threats: The "Gold Drain" and Speculation * 2. IN SEARCH OF AN ILLR * 2.1. The General Arrangements to Borrow * 3. AN ALTERNATIVE ILLR: CENTRAL BANK CURRENCY SWAPS * 3.1. The Fed's Novel Idea * 3.2. Who Needs the IMF? * 3.3. How the Swap Lines Protected U.S. Interests * 3.4. Why did Europe Cooperate? * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 4 - The Exchange Stabilization Fund and the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s * 1. THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND * 2. 1980s: GLOBAL BANKING AND THE DEBT CRISIS * 2.1. The IMF's "Concerted Lending" Strategy and the Problem of Unresponsiveness * 2.2. The ESF and "Bridge Loans": Correcting for the Problem of IMF Unresponsiveness * 3. 1990s: PORTFOLIO FLOWS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT CRISES * 3.1. Capital Account Crises and IMF Resource Insufficiency * 3.2. The ESF and Supplemental Loans: Correcting for the Problem of IMF Resource Insufficiency * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 5 - Who's In, Who's Out, and Why? Selecting Whom to Bailout, 1983-1999 * 1. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND ESF BAILOUT SELECTION * 2. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF ESF BAILOUT SELECTION * 3. RESULTS * 4. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 6 - U.S. International Bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s * 1. CASE SELECTION * 2. THE CASES * 2.1. Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 1982-1983 * 2.2. Argentina, 1984 * 2.3. Poland, 1989 * 2.4. Mexico, 1995 * 2.5. Thailand, 1997 * 2.6. Indonesia and South Korea, 1997 * 2.7. Declining Use: The ESF is Put Out to Pasture * 3. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 7 - The United States as ILLR during the Great Panic of 2008-2009 * 1. BACKGROUND: "A NOVEL ASPECT" OF THE GREAT PANIC OF 2008 * 2. U.S. FINANCIAL INTERESTS AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS * 3. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FED SWAP LINE SELECTION * 4. THE INTEREST RATE THREAT AND THE FED'S ILLR ACTIONS * 5. TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF FOMC MEETINGS * 5.1 The Initiation of the Swap Lines and the TAF, August 2007 - December 2007 * 5.2 Incremental Expansion of Liquidity Facilities, March 2008 - August 2008 * 5.3. Rapid Growth of the Swap Program: September 15, 2008 - October 28, 2008 * 5.4. Swap Lines for Four Emerging Markets: October 29, 2008 * 6. CONCLUSIONS * CHAPTER 8 - Conclusions * 1. CONTRIBUTIONS * 2. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES AS ILLR * 3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS * 4. FINAL THOUGHTS * BIBLIOGRAPHY * APPENDIX
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