Michael Luntley

Wittgenstein

Meaning and Judgement

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein's account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies. Rejecting readings which see a complete break between the Philosophical Investigations and the Tractatus, as well as views of Wittgenstein's mature work which either lament or champion his anti-philosophical 'quietism', Luntley argues that Wittgenstein's abiding concern was to show that the conditions for the possibility of intentionality consist not in a body of theoretical knowledge, but in perceptual knowledge, in our active capacity to 'see things aright'.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley
• Seitenzahl: 187
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Dezember 2003
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 11mm
• Gewicht: 298g
• ISBN-13: 9781405102421
• ISBN-10: 140510242X
• Artikelnr.: 13619855

Autorenporträt

Michael Luntley is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His previous publications include Language, Logic and Experience (1988), Reason, Truth and Self (1995) and Contemporary Philosophy of Thought (Blackwell, 1999).

Inhaltsangabe

Preface.

Abbreviations.

1. Wittgenstein's Master Argument.

2. Realism, Language And Self.

3. This Is How We Play The Game.

4. Rules And Other People.

5. Putting Your Self In The Picture.

6. Seeing Things Aright.

Bibliography.

Index

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Preface ix Introduction xiii I.1 Things Unravel - A Snapshot xiii I.2 Four
Key Points xv I.3 Seeing the Text Aright xvii I.4 Opening Methodological
Remarks xxiii I.5 Outline xxviii 1 Beginning with §1 1 1.1 Starting with
Augustine 1 1.2 Three Things in Section 1 4 1.3 Names are Fundamental 9 1.4
The Wide Angle View 15 1.5 From the Augustinian Conception to Language
Games 18 2 Ostensive Definition: The Shape of the Argument 35 2.1
Introduction 35 2.2 Ostension and Ostensive Definition 37 2.3 Two Issues:
Metaphysical and Developmental 44 2.4 Substantive and Commonplace Roles for
Ostension 47 2.5 Wittgenstein's Use of "Ostensive Definition" 57 2.6
Wittgenstein on Learning 66 2.7 Ostensive Definition 74 3 Linguistic
Regularity, Grammar and Autonomy 88 3.1 Introduction 88 3.2 Regularity and
Grammar - Explanations and Travelogs 89 3.3 Norms, Fitness, Going Up the
Garden Path 95 3.4 Wittgenstein's Idealism 98 3.5 Platitudes - From Bold to
Modest Realism 101 3.6 Wittgenstein's Argument 108 3.7 Demonstrative
Thoughts 114 3.8 Closing "Oughts" 116 4 Explanations 125 4.1 Introduction
125 4.2 Three Claims in §109 127 4.3 Philosophy can Offer No Explanations
132 4.4 Insightful Descriptions 143 4.5 The Sense of Fit 152 Appendix What
Happens to the Private Language Argument? 159 Bibliography 170 Index 000

Rezensionen

"The largely moribund state of current Wittgenstein scholarshipought to be radically changed for the better by this conspicuouslyinteresting and insightful book." Alan Thomas, PhilosophicalBooks

"Michael Luntley offers a striking interpretation ofWittgenstein's philosophy, one aimed at displaying and defendingWittgenstein's positive contribution in the later work. The resultis a theory of the conditions for the possibility ofintentionality, a theory that identifies the subject as agent inthe world with that condition. Powerfully argued, this interestingand original treatment of Wittgenstein's later philosophy raises achallenge for all of us who find a social dimension inWittgenstein's account of intentionality and normativity."Meredith Williams, The Johns Hopkins University

"Luntley provides an intriguing discussion of Wittgenstein'searly work, arbitrating judiciously between realist readings thatemphasise the place of reference in its account of language, andnon-realist readings that emphasise inference." DanielWhiting, University of Reading,Philosophical Investigations 28/4, October 2005