What matters in survival? What relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual? According to Douglas Ehring's radical view, nothing matters in survival: there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern.
What matters in survival? What relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual? According to Douglas Ehring's radical view, nothing matters in survival: there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern.
Douglas Ehring is the William Edward Easterwood Professor of Philosophy at Southern Methodist University. His publications include Tropes (2011) and Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation (1997).
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1: The Divergence Argument 2: Fission and Shared Stages 3: Fission and Indeterminacy 4: Generalizing from Fission 5: The Triviality Argument 6: The Non-Triviality Principle and Objections to its Application Epilogue: Possible Implications for Rationality and Ethics Bibliography
Introduction 1: The Divergence Argument 2: Fission and Shared Stages 3: Fission and Indeterminacy 4: Generalizing from Fission 5: The Triviality Argument 6: The Non-Triviality Principle and Objections to its Application Epilogue: Possible Implications for Rationality and Ethics Bibliography
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