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As the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) enters its seventh year, air power strategists must consider future scenarios where many of the current conditions that contribute to air power's effectiveness today may not exist in the future. Specifically, the synergistic partnership between air power, joint and coalition forces, and the American political administration that exists in contemporary times may be affected by any number of factors. This paper proposes that contemporary and future air strategists will have to consider three scenarios where air power will assume a primary, or at least greater, role in contributing to regional stability as the GWOT continues to unfold. Strategists will be required to consider how to develop partner-nation air forces, how to support indigenous partner-nation ground and air forces in kinetic and non-kinetic operations, and the possibility American air power will have to substitute for, rather than work with, joint and coalition ground forces. To prepare for these scenarios, contemporary and future air power strategists can examine American air power's successes and failures during the eight-year Secret War in Laos in order to draw relevant lessons and considerations.