38,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandkostenfrei*
Versandfertig in 1-2 Wochen
payback
19 °P sammeln
  • Broschiertes Buch

Explains how governments are structured. This book shows why an increase in the number of 'veto players', or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo.

Produktbeschreibung
Explains how governments are structured. This book shows why an increase in the number of 'veto players', or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo.
Autorenporträt
George Tsebelis is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics and coauthor of Bicameralism. The recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship, a Hoover National Fellowship, and a Russell Sage Fellowship, he has published numerous papers on the institutions of the European Union and on comparative institutional analysis.