Uneasy Partnerships

China's Engagement with Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform
Herausgeber: Fingar, Thomas

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Thomas Fingar is Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Previously, he served concurrently as the first Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He is the author of Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford, 2011) and editor of The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 264
• Erscheinungstermin: 18. April 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 22mm
• Gewicht: 360g
• ISBN-13: 9781503601963
• ISBN-10: 150360196X
• Artikelnr.: 46453966

Autorenporträt

Thomas Fingar is Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Previously, he served concurrently as the first Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He is the author of Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford, 2011) and editor of The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Uneasy Partnerships  Thomas Fingar
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the framework that helped focus the work of
contributors and explains why this approach was utilized instead of
approaches that attempt to prove or disprove general theories about China's
foreign policy behavior or to explain the actions of China and specific
partners using international relations theory. The framework required
contributors to identify the most important factors shaping the
perceptions, priorities, and policies of the country examined, and to pay
particular attention to the relative importance of security and economic
concerns and objectives.
2Sources and Shapers of China's Global Engagement  Thomas Fingar
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the overarching objectives of China's "reform and
opening" strategy in order to provide a baseline and context for
understanding how China's engagement with the partners examined in other
chapters reflects and derives from the strategy to achieve wealth, power,
and influence through participation in the liberal international order led
by the United States. It argues that China's highest priorities are
security/stability and sustained economic development/modernization, and
that Beijing's policies toward other countries are shaped by perceptions of
what a given country can do to threaten or enhance China's security, and
what that country can contribute to China's quest for rapid economic
growth. Geography, history, relationships with key third countries, and
developments in the international system, especially the end of the Cold
War also play important roles, as do changes resulting from China's
economic success.
3China's Global Engagement: A Chinese Perspective  Liru Cui
chapter abstract
This chapter examines many of the same factors and considerations as are
examined from an American perspective in Chapter 2 but from a Chinese
perspective. A principal difference is that this chapter emphasizes what
the author considers to be unique features of China's approach, including a
"win-win" approach that enables other states to benefit from China's rise
and does not threaten the security or prosperity of others.
4Beijing's Japan Dilemma: Balancing Nationalism, Legitimacy, and Economic
Opportunity  Suisheng Zhao
chapter abstract
This chapter examines dilemmas resulting from the fact that China's quest
for modernity can be assisted and accelerated by taking advantage of
Japan's markets, technologies, capital, proximity, and incentives to assist
and capitalize on China's eagerness to attract foreign investment, but a
quest that is constrained by historical memories and the part hostility to
Japan plays in the legitimizing mythology of the Chinese Communist Party.
China "needs" Japan to achieve sustained growth, but party leaders must
react forcefully to any real or perceived threat or affront from Japan.
Public readiness to protest alleged Japanese affronts is a problem for
Beijing because demonstrations can easily morph into protests against
corruption, environmental degradation, or other downsides of China's
developmental model and/or damage Japanese property in ways that could
cause Japan to pull back form engagement with China.
5Japan and the Rise of China: From Affinity to Alienation  Seiichiro Takagi
chapter abstract
This chapter traces the evolution of Japanese perceptions of and response
to China's quest for sustained growth through engagement with the United
States and its allies. Initially, and for many years, Japan was a willing
contributor to China's "rise" and anticipated that economic development in
China would be accompanied by political reform and amelioration of
historical grievances. Japanese public opinion toward China soured markedly
as China was perceived to act more aggressively toward Japan, and as
anti-Japanese demonstrations in China rekindled concern about China's
regional and global ambitions.
6China and Korea: Proximity, Priorities, and Policy Evolution  Thomas
Fingar
chapter abstract
This chapter examines the evolution of China's perceptions of and policies
toward North and South Korea and how they changed in response to the end of
the Cold War, South Korea's emergence as an advanced industrial economy
eager and able to assist and take advantage of China's quest for sustained
growth, and North Korea's decreasing utility as a security buffer and
limited inability to contribute to China's modernization. It traces the
transformation of Chinese perceptions of North Korea from useful buffer to
problematic source of instability hazardous to China's strategy of
development, and the transformation of Beijing's perception of South Korea
from adversary and ally of Washington to contributor to China's development
and less certain partner of the United States.
7South Korea's Approach to a Rising China: Pragmatic
Opportunism  Myung-Hwan Yu
chapter abstract
This chapter describes South Korea's wariness about China's rise, eagerness
to take advantage of economic opportunities resulting from China's
development, and hope that China will contribute to management and
alleviation of North Korean hostility. It describes the pragmatic, even
utilitarian ways in which South Korea perceives and responds to
developments in China while holding tight to its alliance with the United
States. China and the ROK know one another well and interact with
clear-eyed pragmatism and opportunism.
8Geography and Destiny: DPRK Concerns and Objectives with Respect to
China  Thomas Fingar and David Straub
chapter abstract
This chapter examines North Korean concerns and attempts to placate,
balance, and benefit from its far larger neighbor. China's rapprochement
with the United States triggered its nuclear weapons program and Beijing's
"abandonment" of the North in order to pursue economic opportunities with
the South prompted the DPRK to seek better relations with Washington,
Tokyo, and Seoul, but those efforts failed, leaving it even more dependent
on an increasingly unfriendly China.
9Soviet/Russia-China Relations: Coming Full Circle?  Artyom Lukin
chapter abstract
This chapter focuses on Soviet/Russian perceptions of China's rise and
describes how developments in both countries made it difficult or
unimportant for either to devote much attention to the other until quite
recently when they rediscovered useful economic and political
complementarities. Neither wants to return to anything like their
relationship in the 1950s but there may be some nostalgia or renewed
interest in using relations with one another to counterbalance the United
States.
10China's Engagement with Northeast Asia: Patterns,Trends, and
Themes  Thomas Fingar
chapter abstract
This chapter identifies and explores a number of patterns and trends in
China's engagement with key states in Northeast Asia, tracing several of
them to the influence of third country developments, geography, and growing
interdependence. It also compares findings and patterns that emerge from
the chapters in this book to those of the companion volume on China's
relations with South and Central Asia.