Banks Miller, Brett Curry

U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

United States Attorneys (USAs), the chief federal prosecutors in each judicial district, are key in determining how the federal government uses coercive force against its citizens. How much control do national political actors exert over the prosecutorial decisions of USAs? This book investigates this question using a unique dataset of federal criminal prosecutions between 1986 and 2015 that captures both decisions by USAs to file cases as well as the sentences thatresult.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
• Seitenzahl: 224
• Erscheinungstermin: 24. Januar 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 14mm
• Gewicht: 485g
• ISBN-13: 9780190928247
• ISBN-10: 0190928247
• Artikelnr.: 54318876

Autorenporträt

Banks Miller is Associate Professor of Political Science & Public Policy at the University of Texas at Dallas. He has research interests in judicial politics, judicial decision making, and the role of attorneys in politics. Previous research has appeared in Law & Society Review, the Journal of Law & Courts, and Political Research Quarterly. Brett Curry is Professor of Political Science at Georgia Southern University. His research centers on aspects of judicial politics and decision making. His scholarship has been published in a number of journals including the Journal of Politics, Law & Society Review, Law & Social Inquiry, American Politics Research, and Justice System Journal. He also coauthored the book, Decision Making by the Modern Supreme Court (2011).

Inhaltsangabe

List of Figures and Tables
List of Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Three Case Studies in Political Control
3. Principal-Agent Theory, Career Prospects, and United States Attorneys
4. Describing the Data and Issue Areas
5. Political Responsiveness and Case Filings
6. Political Responsiveness and Sentence Length
7. Political Responsiveness and Career Prospects
8. Concluding Thoughts and Implications
Methodological Appendix
References
Index