Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen of his most important essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts. Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy…mehr
Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen of his most important essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts. Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
Hartry Field is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. He is author of Science Without Numbers (198?), which won the Lakatos/Matchette Prize, and Realism, Mathematics, and Modality (199?).
Inhaltsangabe
Preface I. Truth, Meaning and Propositional Attitudes 1: Tarski's Theory of Truth Postscript 2: Mental Representation Postscript 3: Stalnaker on Intentionality 4: Deflationist Theories of Meaning and Content Postscript 5: Attributions of Meaning and Content II. Indeterminacy and Factual Defectiveness 6: Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference Postscript 7: Quine and the Correspondence Theory Postscript 8: Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse 9: Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy Postscript 10: Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle Postscript III. Objectivity 11: Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects 12: Which Undecidable Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values?Postscript 13: Apriority as an Evaluative Notion Bibliography, Index
Preface I. Truth, Meaning and Propositional Attitudes 1: Tarski's Theory of Truth Postscript 2: Mental Representation Postscript 3: Stalnaker on Intentionality 4: Deflationist Theories of Meaning and Content Postscript 5: Attributions of Meaning and Content II. Indeterminacy and Factual Defectiveness 6: Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference Postscript 7: Quine and the Correspondence Theory Postscript 8: Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse 9: Some Thoughts on Radical Indeterminacy Postscript 10: Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle Postscript III. Objectivity 11: Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects 12: Which Undecidable Sentences Have Determinate Truth Values?Postscript 13: Apriority as an Evaluative Notion Bibliography, Index
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