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One Size Fits All?: Assessment of the National Space-Based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Strategy59,99 €![Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Dilemma: Can the Department of Defense Achieve Information Superiority?]( "Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Dilemma: Can the Department of Defense Achieve Information Superiority?")
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Transformational Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR): The E-10A and Implications for the Future59,99 €![The New Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Cockpit: Examining the Contributions of Emerging Unmanned Aircraft System]( "The New Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Cockpit: Examining the Contributions of Emerging Unmanned Aircraft System")
The New Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Cockpit: Examining the Contributions of Emerging Unmanned Aircraft System59,99 €![A Validation Assessment of Thunder 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Module]( "A Validation Assessment of Thunder 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Module")
A Validation Assessment of Thunder 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Module59,99 €![Future of Security Force Assistance: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the Right Organization?]( "Future of Security Force Assistance: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the Right Organization?")
Future of Security Force Assistance: Is the Modular Brigade Combat Team the Right Organization?59,99 €
The metamorphosis of the United States Army's tactical Military Intelligence (MI) organization and doctrine since 1976 has been remarkable. Transitioning from a conglomerate of capabilities borrowed from disparate organizations, MI units became holistic MI organizations. Equipped with increasingly robust collection capability MI became ever more capable of all-source intelligence production. Change continues through the provision of MI capability to lower echelons. As collection capability in the brigade combat team (BCT) increased collective MI experience and leadership in planning and direction of collection decreased. While intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and soldiers transferred from the division echelon to the BCT, the MI collective experience and leadership did not. Additionally, a 30-year old inconsistency concerning staff authority in collection direction continues. With an increasing ISR capability, reduction in collective MI experience influencing BCT ISR, and an ongoing rift in collection direction authority, does the Army model for ISR meet the needs of the BCT commander of the future?