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This book reconciles the conflicting evidence of simultaneous improvements in the governance of post-Soviet states and the unmistakable signs of growing predation and systemic corruption. To better understand how corruption and statism can coincide with improved governance, Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats focuses on the varying ways in which legislatures and bureaucrats have drafted regulatory policy--the state's key economic policy tool in capitalist socieites--and implemented it in Russia and Kazakhstan.

Produktbeschreibung
This book reconciles the conflicting evidence of simultaneous improvements in the governance of post-Soviet states and the unmistakable signs of growing predation and systemic corruption. To better understand how corruption and statism can coincide with improved governance, Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats focuses on the varying ways in which legislatures and bureaucrats have drafted regulatory policy--the state's key economic policy tool in capitalist socieites--and implemented it in Russia and Kazakhstan.
Autorenporträt
Dinissa Duvanova is Associate Professor in International Relations at Lehigh University. Her research focuses on the political economy, bureaucratic politics, and technology-enabled forms of political participation in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Her publications appear in British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Journal of Comparative Economics and World Development and other journals. Her book Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe and Eurasia: Collective Goods, Selective Incentives, and Predatory States (Cambridge University Press, February 2013) was awarded the Ed A. Hewett Prize for outstanding publication on the political economy of Russia, Eurasia and/or Eastern Europe.