The Rebirth of the Chateau General in the Age of Information
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The United States Air Force has created a culture of micromanagement. This culture is the result of a philosophy on war that emphasizes detailed command and the centralization of decision making authority. It is exacerbated by rapidly developing technology that makes centralized command more feasible and creates an illusion of perfect situational awareness. The micromanagement culture is further enhanced by the application of technology intended to flatten an organizational hierarchy without actually changing or reducing the rigidly vertical military command structure. The Air Force has willfu...
The United States Air Force has created a culture of micromanagement. This culture is the result of a philosophy on war that emphasizes detailed command and the centralization of decision making authority. It is exacerbated by rapidly developing technology that makes centralized command more feasible and creates an illusion of perfect situational awareness. The micromanagement culture is further enhanced by the application of technology intended to flatten an organizational hierarchy without actually changing or reducing the rigidly vertical military command structure. The Air Force has willfully misinterpreted some of the most powerful concepts in modern warfare, even as other services wholeheartedly embrace these ideas. Air Force doctrine glaringly misinterprets the inherent speed of aircraft and information systems as substitutes for timely decision making by subordinates, and uses this as justification for an increasingly centralized command and control structure. All this to ensure that the decades old mantra of airpower controlled by an airman is not challenged in the joint arena. The Air Force chateau generals in the Air Operations Center move the tactical units under their command around an electronic situation board, tenaciously retaining decision making authority over air assets and denying this authority to subordinates. The end result is a slower than necessary adaptation to changing situations and junior officers who are potentially unprepared and unwilling to take initiative.
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