William H. Smith draws on both phenomenology and contemporary moral theory to argue that the source of moral normativity-that is, the justification of morality's binding force-is the legitimate authority of other persons to hold us morally accountable and our self-responsible commitment to live up to that demand.
William H. Smith draws on both phenomenology and contemporary moral theory to argue that the source of moral normativity-that is, the justification of morality's binding force-is the legitimate authority of other persons to hold us morally accountable and our self-responsible commitment to live up to that demand.
William H. Smith is Lecturer in Philosophy at Seattle University.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction: The Problem of Moral Normativity Part 1: The First Person 1. Moral Realism and Korsgaard's Dilemma 2. Respect and Drummond's Husserlian Metaethics Part 2: The Second Person 3. Dignity and Darwall's Second Person Standpoint 4. Authority and Levinas's Face to Face Part 3: Subjectivity and Responsibility 5. Nihilism and Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology 6. A Phenomenological Theory of Moral Normativity
Introduction: The Problem of Moral Normativity Part 1: The First Person 1. Moral Realism and Korsgaard's Dilemma 2. Respect and Drummond's Husserlian Metaethics Part 2: The Second Person 3. Dignity and Darwall's Second Person Standpoint 4. Authority and Levinas's Face to Face Part 3: Subjectivity and Responsibility 5. Nihilism and Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology 6. A Phenomenological Theory of Moral Normativity
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