Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states.
Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states.
Angela Mendelovici is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I: Introduction 1. Fixing Reference on Intentionality 2. Goals and Methodology Part II: Alternative Theories of Intentionality 3. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories 4. Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again Part III: The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 5. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 6. PIT's Status as a Theory of Intentionality Part IV: Challenging Cases 7. Thought 8. Nonconscious States Part V: The Aspect View 9. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? Part VI: Conclusion 10. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena
Part I: Introduction 1. Fixing Reference on Intentionality 2. Goals and Methodology Part II: Alternative Theories of Intentionality 3. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories 4. Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again Part III: The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 5. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory 6. PIT's Status as a Theory of Intentionality Part IV: Challenging Cases 7. Thought 8. Nonconscious States Part V: The Aspect View 9. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? Part VI: Conclusion 10. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena
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