Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind. The theory relies upon traditional categories of psychology, including such notions as belief and desire. It also draws upon and thus inherits some of the problems of artificial intelligence which it attempts to answer, including what bestows meaning or content upon a thought and what distinguishes genuine from simulated thought.
Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind. The theory relies upon traditional categories of psychology, including such notions as belief and desire. It also draws upon and thus inherits some of the problems of artificial intelligence which it attempts to answer, including what bestows meaning or content upon a thought and what distinguishes genuine from simulated thought.
Acknowledgements Introduction Part I. The Mental Language: 1. Mentalistic constructs 2. The Representational Theory of the Mind 3. Folk psychology and Representationalism 4. Sententialism 5. The regress of embedded agents 6. Notation and content Part II. The Frame Problem and Scripts: 7. Combinatorial explosion 8. The range and context of scripts 9. Modular cognitive systems Part III. Intelligence, Rationality and Behavior: 10. Intelligent behavior and brute reaction 11. Rationality and behavior 12. Causal waywardness 13. Empirical tests of rationality Part IV. Along the Cognitive Spectrum: 14. The scope of Sententialism 15. From infant to adult 16. Doxastic holism and Mentalese ambiguity Part V. The Matter of Intentionality: 17. Searle's argument against Artificial Intelligence 18. Artificial Intelligence at bay 19. Language comprehension and translation 20. Fragmented agents 21. Cognitive psychology as a formal theory 22. The mundane matter of mind Part VI. Fixing the Content of Mental Sentences: 23. Empiricism and mental representations 24. A causal explanation of sensuous representation 25. Objections and replies 26. Sensory doppelgängers 27. Up from sensation 28. Meaning and definition Part VII. The Quality of Consciousness: 28. Functional accounts of consciousness 29. Could qualia be non-psychological? 30. Sententialism and consciousness 31. Sensation and qualia 32. Moods 33. The subjectivity of consciousness 34. What it is like to be different 35. Artificial consciousness References Index.
Acknowledgements Introduction Part I. The Mental Language: 1. Mentalistic constructs 2. The Representational Theory of the Mind 3. Folk psychology and Representationalism 4. Sententialism 5. The regress of embedded agents 6. Notation and content Part II. The Frame Problem and Scripts: 7. Combinatorial explosion 8. The range and context of scripts 9. Modular cognitive systems Part III. Intelligence, Rationality and Behavior: 10. Intelligent behavior and brute reaction 11. Rationality and behavior 12. Causal waywardness 13. Empirical tests of rationality Part IV. Along the Cognitive Spectrum: 14. The scope of Sententialism 15. From infant to adult 16. Doxastic holism and Mentalese ambiguity Part V. The Matter of Intentionality: 17. Searle's argument against Artificial Intelligence 18. Artificial Intelligence at bay 19. Language comprehension and translation 20. Fragmented agents 21. Cognitive psychology as a formal theory 22. The mundane matter of mind Part VI. Fixing the Content of Mental Sentences: 23. Empiricism and mental representations 24. A causal explanation of sensuous representation 25. Objections and replies 26. Sensory doppelgängers 27. Up from sensation 28. Meaning and definition Part VII. The Quality of Consciousness: 28. Functional accounts of consciousness 29. Could qualia be non-psychological? 30. Sententialism and consciousness 31. Sensation and qualia 32. Moods 33. The subjectivity of consciousness 34. What it is like to be different 35. Artificial consciousness References Index.
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