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"This book analyzes government formation and survival in parliamentary democracies, for the first time using computational models to do this. We model "functionally rational' politicians who attack complex problems using simple rules of thumb, and develop artificial intelligence algorithms, similar to those which have beaten the world's best poker players, which relentlessly learn how best to "win" the political game"--

Produktbeschreibung
"This book analyzes government formation and survival in parliamentary democracies, for the first time using computational models to do this. We model "functionally rational' politicians who attack complex problems using simple rules of thumb, and develop artificial intelligence algorithms, similar to those which have beaten the world's best poker players, which relentlessly learn how best to "win" the political game"--
Autorenporträt
Scott de Marchi is Professor of Political Science and Director of Decision Science at Duke University. He is a principal investigator for the for the National Science Foundation's Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models program and his research focuses on decision-making in contexts that include Congress, coalition and crisis bargaining, and interstate conflict.