The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
Herausgeber: Christensen, David; Lackey, Jennifer
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays
Herausgeber: Christensen, David; Lackey, Jennifer
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This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.
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This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 288
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. Juni 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 163mm x 25mm
- Gewicht: 576g
- ISBN-13: 9780199698370
- ISBN-10: 0199698376
- Artikelnr.: 37087792
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 288
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. Juni 2013
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 163mm x 25mm
- Gewicht: 576g
- ISBN-13: 9780199698370
- ISBN-10: 0199698376
- Artikelnr.: 37087792
David Christensen is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He has written on such questions as: What determines whether a given bit of evidence supports or refutes a given theory? What logical principles apply to rational beliefs (either degrees of belief or all-or-nothing beliefs)? How should our theory of ideal rationality accommodate rational self-doubt-and in particular, to doubts generated by the disagreement of apparent epistemic peers? He is the author of Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief (2005, Oxford University Press). Jennifer Lackey is Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. Her recent research focuses on the epistemology of groups, the epistemology of testimony, norms of assertion, and the epistemic significance of disagreement. She has co-edited (with Ernest Sosa) The Epistemology of Testimony (2006, Oxford University Press) and is the author of Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (2008, Oxford: Oxford University Press). She has been the recipient of a Charles A. Ryskamp Research Fellowship through the American Council of Learned Societies (2007-2008), as well as a Summer Stipend through the National Endowment for the Humanities. She is also a winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize (2005).
* List of Contributors
* Introduction
* Part One: The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists
* A. For Steadfastness
* 1: John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan: Disagreement Without
Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts
* 2: Thomas Kelly: Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
* 3: Brian Weatherson: Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
* B. For Conciliation
* 4: David Christensen: Epistemic Modesty Defended
* 5: Stewart Cohen: A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View
* Part Two: Disagreement in Philosophy
* 6: Bryan Frances: Philosophical Renegades
* 7: Sanford Goldberg: Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion
* 8: Ernest Sosa: Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It
Be Founded on Intuitions?
* Part Three: New Concepts and New Problems in the Epistemology of
Disagreement
* 9: Robert Audi: Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual
Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements
* 10: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent
* 11: Jennifer Lackey: Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers
Matter
* Index
* Introduction
* Part One: The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists
* A. For Steadfastness
* 1: John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan: Disagreement Without
Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts
* 2: Thomas Kelly: Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
* 3: Brian Weatherson: Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
* B. For Conciliation
* 4: David Christensen: Epistemic Modesty Defended
* 5: Stewart Cohen: A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View
* Part Two: Disagreement in Philosophy
* 6: Bryan Frances: Philosophical Renegades
* 7: Sanford Goldberg: Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion
* 8: Ernest Sosa: Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It
Be Founded on Intuitions?
* Part Three: New Concepts and New Problems in the Epistemology of
Disagreement
* 9: Robert Audi: Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual
Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements
* 10: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent
* 11: Jennifer Lackey: Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers
Matter
* Index
* List of Contributors
* Introduction
* Part One: The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists
* A. For Steadfastness
* 1: John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan: Disagreement Without
Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts
* 2: Thomas Kelly: Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
* 3: Brian Weatherson: Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
* B. For Conciliation
* 4: David Christensen: Epistemic Modesty Defended
* 5: Stewart Cohen: A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View
* Part Two: Disagreement in Philosophy
* 6: Bryan Frances: Philosophical Renegades
* 7: Sanford Goldberg: Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion
* 8: Ernest Sosa: Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It
Be Founded on Intuitions?
* Part Three: New Concepts and New Problems in the Epistemology of
Disagreement
* 9: Robert Audi: Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual
Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements
* 10: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent
* 11: Jennifer Lackey: Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers
Matter
* Index
* Introduction
* Part One: The Debate between Conciliatory and Steadfast Theorists
* A. For Steadfastness
* 1: John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan: Disagreement Without
Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts
* 2: Thomas Kelly: Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment
* 3: Brian Weatherson: Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
* B. For Conciliation
* 4: David Christensen: Epistemic Modesty Defended
* 5: Stewart Cohen: A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View
* Part Two: Disagreement in Philosophy
* 6: Bryan Frances: Philosophical Renegades
* 7: Sanford Goldberg: Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion
* 8: Ernest Sosa: Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It
Be Founded on Intuitions?
* Part Three: New Concepts and New Problems in the Epistemology of
Disagreement
* 9: Robert Audi: Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual
Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements
* 10: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent
* 11: Jennifer Lackey: Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers
Matter
* Index