This fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy argues that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights.
This fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy argues that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights.
Neal Devins, Goodrich Professor of Law, Professor of Government, Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law and Director, Election Law Program, William and Mary Louis Fischer, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Introduction 1. Judicial Supremacy as Orthodoxy 2. Who Participates? 3. Federalism 4. Separation of Powers 5. The War Power 6. Privacy 7. Race 8. Speech 9. Religion 10. The Ongoing Dialogue Notes Case Index Subject Index
Preface Introduction 1. Judicial Supremacy as Orthodoxy 2. Who Participates? 3. Federalism 4. Separation of Powers 5. The War Power 6. Privacy 7. Race 8. Speech 9. Religion 10. The Ongoing Dialogue Notes Case Index Subject Index
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Shop der buecher.de GmbH & Co. KG Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg Amtsgericht Augsburg HRA 13309
