The Civil Military Operations Center in Operation Uphold Democracy
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Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti was a huge military operational success. The US-led, multinational effort of September, 1994 restored President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his democratic government back to power. Six months later, having achieved its desired end state, the multinational force transferred full authority to the United Nations. Unlike Operations Restore Hope in Somalia and Support Hope in Rwanda, Uphold Democracy was not a purely humanitarian assistance mission. However, in all three, the CMOC was the principal contact between military forces and the myriad of civilian organiz...
Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti was a huge military operational success. The US-led, multinational effort of September, 1994 restored President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his democratic government back to power. Six months later, having achieved its desired end state, the multinational force transferred full authority to the United Nations. Unlike Operations Restore Hope in Somalia and Support Hope in Rwanda, Uphold Democracy was not a purely humanitarian assistance mission. However, in all three, the CMOC was the principal contact between military forces and the myriad of civilian organizations assisting the relief effort. The proliferation of these organizations, combined with the growing number of worldwide military operations other than war (MOOTW), makes the CMOC a critical player in our conduct of operations. In Haiti, the CMOC evolved even further, bridging the gap between planning shortfalls and cultural differences. This paper seeks to determine the overall effectiveness of Haiti's CMOCs. Chapter 1 offers a brief historical evolution of the crisis that led to US involvement. Chapter 2 highlights the CMOC's origins and its rapid ascension into current joint doctrine. Chapter 3 describes CMOC employment in Haiti and its relationship to the civilian organizations it served. Chapter 4 concludes with the central cause and effect problem of incomplete interagency planning, which resulted in degraded unity of effort.
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