Stability Force: The Missing Link in Achieving Full Spectrum Dominance - Andrews, Frank L.
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To better face the changing operational environment and achieve full spectrum dominance, the U.S. Army should dedicate a portion of the force to conduct stability operations. Active Army units, structured to conduct or support major combat operations, must perform short-notice stability operations with little specialized training. Conversely, they must retrain and reorganize for stability operations when given advance notice. The increased number of stability operations, some of which have lasted for several years, has led to greater reliance on the reserve component, which contains units with…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
To better face the changing operational environment and achieve full spectrum dominance, the U.S. Army should dedicate a portion of the force to conduct stability operations. Active Army units, structured to conduct or support major combat operations, must perform short-notice stability operations with little specialized training. Conversely, they must retrain and reorganize for stability operations when given advance notice. The increased number of stability operations, some of which have lasted for several years, has led to greater reliance on the reserve component, which contains units with the capabilities required for stability operations. Current operational and training doctrine maintains that battle-focused training is the best method of preparing units for full spectrum operations. This monograph examines two historical case studies to determine the effectiveness of this approach. The first case study involves 10th Mountain Division in Operation Uphold Democracy. The second case study examines 1st Cavalry Division, as it restructured and retrained for a stability operation in Bosnia. Finally, an alternative model, with certain units dedicated to conducting stability operations, is considered. These three approaches are evaluated against criteria drawn from the Army's principles of training. This monograph concludes that the Army's "just in time" training approach remains valid to prepare units to operate in uncertain environments, with the exception of the headquarters units. The Army should avoid retraining and reorganizing active duty units for long-term stability operations. Furthermore, the Army requires restructuring to balance the number of combat arms, combat support, and combat service supports units in the active and reserve component. Finally, dedicating certain units to conduct major combat operations and others to conduct stability operations is a superior method to enable the Army to achieve full spectrum dominance.