The subject of this textbook is social choice theory and welfare economics. In addition to covering the well-known areas of the subject, it includes new issues like welfare evaluation under uncertainty, and inequality. Its easy exposition along with graphical and numerical illustrations of the concepts makes it a useful text.
The subject of this textbook is social choice theory and welfare economics. In addition to covering the well-known areas of the subject, it includes new issues like welfare evaluation under uncertainty, and inequality. Its easy exposition along with graphical and numerical illustrations of the concepts makes it a useful text.
Satya R. Chakravarty is Professor of Economics at the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta. He is a renowned name in the field of studies of Game Theory and Social Choice and has published widely, both books and in reputed journals. He authored 'A Course on Cooperative Game Theory' with Manipushpak Mitra that was published by the Press in 2015.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Introduction Bibliography 2. Individual and social orderings 2.1. Introduction 2.2. relations 2.3. Preference relations and choice sets 2.4. Social orderings, quasi-orderings and weak quasi-orderings 2.5. Exercises 2.6. Bibliographical notes bibliography 3. May's theorem 3.1. Introduction 3.2. The framework 3.3. May's theorem 3.4. Robustness of the axioms 3.5. Exercises 3.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 4. Arrow's theorem with individual preferences 4.1. Introduction 4.2. The framework 4.3. The Arrow Impossibility theorem 4.4. Two proofs of Arrow's theorem 4.5. Exercises 4.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 5. Relaxing Arrow's axioms 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Relaxing Weak Pareto 5.3. Relaxing transitivity of (Social) binary relations 5.4. Domain restriction: single peaked preferences 5.5. Exercises 5.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 6. Arrow's theorem with utilities 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The framework and assumptions 6.3. Measurability and comparability 6.4. Arrow's theorem 6.5. Positional dictatorships 6.6. Leximin 6.7. Utilitarianism 6.8. Exercises 6.9. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 7. Harsanyi's Social Aggregation theorem 7.1. Introduction 7.2. The model 7.3. Appendix 7.4. Illustrative examples 7.5. Exercises 7.6. Bibliographical notes and discussions Bibliography 8. Distributional ethics I 8.1. Introduction 8.2. Basics and preliminaries 8.3. Common features 8.4. The direct approach 8.5. The inclusive-measure of well-being approach 8.6. Direct descriptive inequality indices and reduced form welfare functions 8.7. Measuring inequality within the Harsanyi framework 8.8. Comparability between achievement and shortfall inequality: an expository analysis 8.9. Equality of opportunity: an illustrative discussion 8.10. Inequality and welfare with an ordinal dimension of well-being 8.11. Inequality as an ordinal notion 8.12. Fairness in network resource allocation: an analytical exposition 8.13. Exercises 8.14. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 9. Distributional ethics II 9.1. Motivations 9.2. Basics and preliminaries 9.3. Common features 9.4. The direct approach 9.5. The inclusive-measure of well-being approach 9.6. Direct descriptive multidimensional inequality indices and reduced form welfare functions 9.7. Inequality under uncertainty: a brief discussion 9.8 Exercises 9.9 Bibliographical notes Bibliography 10. Social choice functions 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The framework and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 10.3. Two proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 10.4. Single-peaked preferences 10.5. Exercises 10.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 11. Strategyproofness on quasi-linear domains 11.1. Introduction 11.2. The pure public goods problem 11.3. Allocation of a single indivisible object 11.4. Relaxing outcome efficiency: Affine maximizers 11.5. Exercises 11.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography Index.
Preface 1. Introduction Bibliography 2. Individual and social orderings 2.1. Introduction 2.2. relations 2.3. Preference relations and choice sets 2.4. Social orderings, quasi-orderings and weak quasi-orderings 2.5. Exercises 2.6. Bibliographical notes bibliography 3. May's theorem 3.1. Introduction 3.2. The framework 3.3. May's theorem 3.4. Robustness of the axioms 3.5. Exercises 3.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 4. Arrow's theorem with individual preferences 4.1. Introduction 4.2. The framework 4.3. The Arrow Impossibility theorem 4.4. Two proofs of Arrow's theorem 4.5. Exercises 4.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 5. Relaxing Arrow's axioms 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Relaxing Weak Pareto 5.3. Relaxing transitivity of (Social) binary relations 5.4. Domain restriction: single peaked preferences 5.5. Exercises 5.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 6. Arrow's theorem with utilities 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The framework and assumptions 6.3. Measurability and comparability 6.4. Arrow's theorem 6.5. Positional dictatorships 6.6. Leximin 6.7. Utilitarianism 6.8. Exercises 6.9. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 7. Harsanyi's Social Aggregation theorem 7.1. Introduction 7.2. The model 7.3. Appendix 7.4. Illustrative examples 7.5. Exercises 7.6. Bibliographical notes and discussions Bibliography 8. Distributional ethics I 8.1. Introduction 8.2. Basics and preliminaries 8.3. Common features 8.4. The direct approach 8.5. The inclusive-measure of well-being approach 8.6. Direct descriptive inequality indices and reduced form welfare functions 8.7. Measuring inequality within the Harsanyi framework 8.8. Comparability between achievement and shortfall inequality: an expository analysis 8.9. Equality of opportunity: an illustrative discussion 8.10. Inequality and welfare with an ordinal dimension of well-being 8.11. Inequality as an ordinal notion 8.12. Fairness in network resource allocation: an analytical exposition 8.13. Exercises 8.14. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 9. Distributional ethics II 9.1. Motivations 9.2. Basics and preliminaries 9.3. Common features 9.4. The direct approach 9.5. The inclusive-measure of well-being approach 9.6. Direct descriptive multidimensional inequality indices and reduced form welfare functions 9.7. Inequality under uncertainty: a brief discussion 9.8 Exercises 9.9 Bibliographical notes Bibliography 10. Social choice functions 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The framework and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 10.3. Two proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 10.4. Single-peaked preferences 10.5. Exercises 10.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography 11. Strategyproofness on quasi-linear domains 11.1. Introduction 11.2. The pure public goods problem 11.3. Allocation of a single indivisible object 11.4. Relaxing outcome efficiency: Affine maximizers 11.5. Exercises 11.6. Bibliographical notes Bibliography Index.
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