Russia's emergence as a Great Power in the 18th century is usually attributed to Peter I's programme of 'Westernising' reforms. But the Russian military did not simply copy European armies. Adapting the tactics of its neighbours on both sides, Russia created a strategy of its own, integrating steppe defence with European concerns.
Russia's emergence as a Great Power in the 18th century is usually attributed to Peter I's programme of 'Westernising' reforms. But the Russian military did not simply copy European armies. Adapting the tactics of its neighbours on both sides, Russia created a strategy of its own, integrating steppe defence with European concerns.
Carol Belkin Stevens is an Associate Professor at Colgate University, Hamilton, New York, specialising in early modern Russia. She is the author of Soldiers on the Steppe (1996) and has been published in numerous journals including Russian History.
Inhaltsangabe
PART I 1450-1598 1. The constituents for Muscovite power, c.1450 2. Creating a Muscovite army, 1462-1533 3. The army that won an empire PART II 1598-1697 1. The political prelude to military reform 2. The Thirteen Years War, 1654-67 3. The steppe frontier after Razzin, 1672-97 PART III 1698-1730 1. Peter the Great and the beginning of the Great Northern War 2. Military instiutionalization after Poltava Conclusion: Russiawithout Peter
PART I 1450-1598 1. The constituents for Muscovite power, c.1450 2. Creating a Muscovite army, 1462-1533 3. The army that won an empire PART II 1598-1697 1. The political prelude to military reform 2. The Thirteen Years War, 1654-67 3. The steppe frontier after Razzin, 1672-97 PART III 1698-1730 1. Peter the Great and the beginning of the Great Northern War 2. Military instiutionalization after Poltava Conclusion: Russiawithout Peter
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