Originally published in 2005. This study develops a principal-agent theory to analyze how changes in procedures and the role of the House Rules Committee have affected policy making in Congress over the past three decades.
Originally published in 2005. This study develops a principal-agent theory to analyze how changes in procedures and the role of the House Rules Committee have affected policy making in Congress over the past three decades.
Bryan W. Marshall is Associate Professor of Political Science at Miami University, Ohio. His areas of specialization include Congress, congressional-executive relations, separation of powers and quantitative methods.
Inhaltsangabe
Contents: Introduction Party leadership and agent performance in Congress Designing an effective agent: understanding institutional changes to the House Rules Committee Political parties and procedural coordination for collective action The role of restrictive rules in the Postreform House The policy implications of special rules: evidence from the House and Senate Floor waivers and procedural partisanship in the House Conclusion and thoughts on the future leverage of procedural choice Bibliography Index.
Contents: Introduction Party leadership and agent performance in Congress Designing an effective agent: understanding institutional changes to the House Rules Committee Political parties and procedural coordination for collective action The role of restrictive rules in the Postreform House The policy implications of special rules: evidence from the House and Senate Floor waivers and procedural partisanship in the House Conclusion and thoughts on the future leverage of procedural choice Bibliography Index.
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