Ellsberg presents a sophisticated and detailed elaboration of the postion originally presented in his much-discussed article, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms." In this cogently argued book, he mounts a powerful and influential challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision, and opens new lines of investigation whose lessons still have not been fully assimilated. First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Ellsberg presents a sophisticated and detailed elaboration of the postion originally presented in his much-discussed article, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms." In this cogently argued book, he mounts a powerful and influential challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision, and opens new lines of investigation whose lessons still have not been fully assimilated.First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Daniel Ellsberg was a strategic analyst with the RAND Corporation, and a defense department and state department official who served in Vietnam. He later revealed to the U.S. Senate and the press the Pentagon Papers, a 7,000 page top secret study of U.S. decision making in Vietnam from 1945 to 1968. For this he faced a trial and a sentence of 115 years in prison, but all charges were dismissed on grounds of gross governmental misconduct against him, which led to the conviction of a number of White House aids and figured in the impeachment proceedings against President Nixon.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgments Note to Reader Foreword, Isaac Levi 1. Ambiguity and Risk Vagueness, Confidence, and the Weight of Arguments The Nature and Uses of Normative Theory The Validation of Normative Propositions The Utility Axioms as Norms Normative Theory and Empirical Research 2. The Bernoulli Proposition A Possible Counterexample: Are there Uncertainties that are Not Risks? Vulgar Evaluations of Risk 3. The Measurement of Definite Opinions von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities Probability as Price "Coherence" and "Definiteness" of Probability-Prices Appendix to Chapter Three On Making a Fool of Oneself: The Requirement of Coherence Acceptable Odds: Definite, Coherent, and Otherwise 4. Opinions and Actions: Which Come First? The Logic of Degrees of Belief Opinions that Make Horse Races Postulate 2: the "Sure-Thing Principle" Intuitive Probabilities and "Vagueness" Appendix to Chapter Four The Savage Postulates The Koopman Axioms 5. Uncertainties that are Not Risks The "Three-Color Urn" Example Vulgar Evaluations of Ambiguity Appendix to Chapter Five 6. Why Are Some Uncertainties Not Risks? Decision Criteria for "Complete Ignorance" Decision Criteria for "Partial Ignorance" 7. The "Restricted Hurwicz Criterion" The "Restricted Bayes/Hurwicz Criterion" Boldness and Prudence: the "n-Color Urn" Example Ignorance, Probability, and Varieties of Gamblers 8. Ambiguity and the Utility Axioms The Pratt/Raiffa Criticisms and the Value of Randomization Rubin's Axiom Allais and the Sure-Thing Principle Winning at Russian Roulette Bibliography
Acknowledgments Note to Reader Foreword, Isaac Levi 1. Ambiguity and Risk Vagueness, Confidence, and the Weight of Arguments The Nature and Uses of Normative Theory The Validation of Normative Propositions The Utility Axioms as Norms Normative Theory and Empirical Research 2. The Bernoulli Proposition A Possible Counterexample: Are there Uncertainties that are Not Risks? Vulgar Evaluations of Risk 3. The Measurement of Definite Opinions von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities Probability as Price "Coherence" and "Definiteness" of Probability-Prices Appendix to Chapter Three On Making a Fool of Oneself: The Requirement of Coherence Acceptable Odds: Definite, Coherent, and Otherwise 4. Opinions and Actions: Which Come First? The Logic of Degrees of Belief Opinions that Make Horse Races Postulate 2: the "Sure-Thing Principle" Intuitive Probabilities and "Vagueness" Appendix to Chapter Four The Savage Postulates The Koopman Axioms 5. Uncertainties that are Not Risks The "Three-Color Urn" Example Vulgar Evaluations of Ambiguity Appendix to Chapter Five 6. Why Are Some Uncertainties Not Risks? Decision Criteria for "Complete Ignorance" Decision Criteria for "Partial Ignorance" 7. The "Restricted Hurwicz Criterion" The "Restricted Bayes/Hurwicz Criterion" Boldness and Prudence: the "n-Color Urn" Example Ignorance, Probability, and Varieties of Gamblers 8. Ambiguity and the Utility Axioms The Pratt/Raiffa Criticisms and the Value of Randomization Rubin's Axiom Allais and the Sure-Thing Principle Winning at Russian Roulette Bibliography
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