Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, Shmuel Zamir

Repeated Games

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 598
• Erscheinungstermin: 28. März 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 35mm
• Gewicht: 958g
• ISBN-13: 9781107662636
• ISBN-10: 110766263X
• Artikelnr.: 40742765

Autorenporträt

The late Jean-François Mertens (11 March 1946-17 July 2012) was a Belgian game theorist and mathematical economist. He earned his PhD from the Université Catholique de Louvain, where he spent his career, and was heavily involved with the university's Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). Mertens was one of the world's leaders in game theory and economic theory. He is the author and coauthor of seminal papers on equilibrium selection in games, formulation of Bayesian analysis, repeated games, stochastic games, the strategic foundations of general equilibrium theory, social choice theory, and dynamic general equilibrium. He was a founding member of the Center for Game Theory in Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, and remained an affiliated member until his death. He was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1981.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Basic results on normal-form games
2. Basic results on extensive-form games
3. The beliefs space
4. General model of repeated games
5. Recursive games
6. Incomplete information on two sides
7. Stochastic games
8. Extensions and further results
9. Non-zero-sum games with incomplete information.