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This study analyzes the Air Force.s decisions made concerning the advancement of tactical conventional airpower from 1953 to 1961. This thesis evaluates the decision- making process at three distinct levels using Graham T. Allison.s three decision-making models. First, this study examines Air Force decision-making based upon grand- strategic, systemic issues to conclude that tactical conventional airpower was given second priority to the dominant policy of strategic nuclear missions as a consequence of President Eisenhower.s desire to balance the federal budget while deterring the Soviet…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
This study analyzes the Air Force.s decisions made concerning the advancement of tactical conventional airpower from 1953 to 1961. This thesis evaluates the decision- making process at three distinct levels using Graham T. Allison.s three decision-making models. First, this study examines Air Force decision-making based upon grand- strategic, systemic issues to conclude that tactical conventional airpower was given second priority to the dominant policy of strategic nuclear missions as a consequence of President Eisenhower.s desire to balance the federal budget while deterring the Soviet Union. Second, an evaluation of organizational decision-making within the various units that contributed to the advancement of tactical airpower reveals that despite the lower level of emphasis, tactical airpower was not entirely neglected.