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Simply stated, joint doctrine drives best at the combatant commander level because the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) is in a position to drive the method of both the organization and the employment for the joint force. By perusing the available literature, it is evident that the most effective examples of joint integration occurred when the GCC exercised the role as the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Although not always smooth, Operation DESERT STORM and the early stages of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM are replete with examples of effective integration of the joint force across the joint functions in combat. In these cases, the GCC was able to personally ensure the integration of his service and functional components through collaborative planning between the staffs of the Combatant Command and the service somponents. Even with execution by the service components, integration remained high as long as operations were centrally managed around the GCC and his service component commanders.