Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favor of another approach--naturalism. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.
Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favor of another approach--naturalism. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.
Penelope Maddy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine, having previously held positions at the University of Illinois, Chicago, and the University of Notre Dame, Indiana.
Inhaltsangabe
PART I: THE PROBLEM 1: The origins of set theory 2: Set theory as a foundation 3: The standard axioms 4: Independent questions 5: New axiom candidates 6: V = L PART II: REALISM 1: Godelian realism 2: Quinean realism 3: Set-theoretic realism 4: A realist's case against V = L 5: Hints of trouble 6: Indispensability and scientific practice 7: Indispensability and mathematical practic PART III: NATURALISM 1: Wittgensteinian anti-philosophy 2: A second Godelian theme 3: Quinean naturalism 4: Mathematical naturalism 5: The problem revisited 6: A naturalist's case against V = L Conclusion Bibliography Index
PART I: THE PROBLEM 1: The origins of set theory 2: Set theory as a foundation 3: The standard axioms 4: Independent questions 5: New axiom candidates 6: V = L PART II: REALISM 1: Godelian realism 2: Quinean realism 3: Set-theoretic realism 4: A realist's case against V = L 5: Hints of trouble 6: Indispensability and scientific practice 7: Indispensability and mathematical practic PART III: NATURALISM 1: Wittgensteinian anti-philosophy 2: A second Godelian theme 3: Quinean naturalism 4: Mathematical naturalism 5: The problem revisited 6: A naturalist's case against V = L Conclusion Bibliography Index
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