This book analyses why the Italian army failed to defeat its Greek opponent between October 1940 and April 1941. It thoroughly examines the multiple forms of ineffectiveness that plagued the political leadership as well as the military organization.
This book analyses why the Italian army failed to defeat its Greek opponent between October 1940 and April 1941. It thoroughly examines the multiple forms of ineffectiveness that plagued the political leadership as well as the military organization.
Richard Carrier is Assistant Professor of Military History at the Royal Military College of Canada. Over the years, he researched extensively on the Italian Army in the Second World War. He is a contributor and the co-editor of Italy and the Second World War: Alternative Perspectives (2018).
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction PART 1: The Army, the Decision, the Campaign 1. The Italian Army, June 1940 2. The Politics of Decision-Making 3. The Campaign PART 2: Analyzing Military Ineffectiveness 4. Rome and Tirana: Failing command structures 5. Weapons and Equipment: Old, faulty, and insufficient 6. Combatants: The behavior of men in battle 7. Logistics: To square the circle Epilogue: Downfall Annex 1: The Regia Aeronautica in the Campaign Annex 2: The Regia Marina in the Campaign
Introduction PART 1: The Army, the Decision, the Campaign 1. The Italian Army, June 1940 2. The Politics of Decision-Making 3. The Campaign PART 2: Analyzing Military Ineffectiveness 4. Rome and Tirana: Failing command structures 5. Weapons and Equipment: Old, faulty, and insufficient 6. Combatants: The behavior of men in battle 7. Logistics: To square the circle Epilogue: Downfall Annex 1: The Regia Aeronautica in the Campaign Annex 2: The Regia Marina in the Campaign
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