Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of morality. Without it, there is no morality in the full sense of the word. In Moral Freedom Hartmann sets out to refute the determinist view that freedom of the will is impossible. Following Kant, while rejecting his transcendentalism, Hartmann first discusses the tension between causality and the freedom of the will. Hartmanns Ethics may well be the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. Kinnegings introduction to this edition sheds light on the volumes continuing relevance.
Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of morality. Without it, there is no morality in the full sense of the word. In Moral Freedom Hartmann sets out to refute the determinist view that freedom of the will is impossible. Following Kant, while rejecting his transcendentalism, Hartmann first discusses the tension between causality and the freedom of the will. Hartmanns Ethics may well be the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. Kinnegings introduction to this edition sheds light on the volumes continuing relevance.
1: The Psychophysical Law 2: Sensation and Measurement 3: Intramodal Matching 4: Cross-Modality Matching 5: Partition Scales and Paradoxes 6: Thresholds and the Neural Quantum 7: Neural Correlates 8: Scaling the Social Consensus 9: Hazards and Remedies
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Section I PRELIMINARY CRITICAL QUESTIONS -- CHAPTER I (LXV) THE CONNECTIONS OF THE PROBLEM -- CHAPTER II (LXVI) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER III (LXVII) ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM -- Section II THE CAUSAL ANTINOMY -- CHAPTER IV (LXVIII) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S SOLUTION -- CHAPTER V (LXIX) DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM -- CHAPTER VI (LXX) DETERMINISM, CAUSAL AND FINALISTIC -- CHAPTER VII (LXXI) ONTOLOGICAL REGULARITY AS THE BASIS OF FREEDOM -- Section III THE ANTINOMY OF THE OUGHT -- CHAPTER VIII (LXXII) CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER IX (LXXIII) FALSE WAYS OF PROVING THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL -- CHAPTER X (LXXIV) THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM -- Section IV ETHICAL PHENOMENA, THEIR EFFICACY AS PROOFS -- CHAPTER XI (LXXV) "PROOFS" OF METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS -- CHAPTER XII (LXXVI) MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION -- CHAPTER XIII (LXXVII) RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY -- CHAPTER XIV (LXXVIII) THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT -- CHAPTER XV (LXXIX) SUPPLEMENTARY GROUPS OF FACTS -- CHAPTER XVI (LXXX) OUGHT AND THE WILL -- Section V ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL FREEDOM -- CHAPTER XVII (LXXXI) AUTONOMY OF THE PERSON AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES -- CHAPTER XVIII (LXXXII) SOLUTION OF THE OUGHT-ANTINOMY -- CHAPTER XIX (LXXXIII) PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED -- Section VI APPENDIX TO THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER XX (LXXXIV) APPARENT AND REAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY -- INDEX
1: The Psychophysical Law 2: Sensation and Measurement 3: Intramodal Matching 4: Cross-Modality Matching 5: Partition Scales and Paradoxes 6: Thresholds and the Neural Quantum 7: Neural Correlates 8: Scaling the Social Consensus 9: Hazards and Remedies
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Section I PRELIMINARY CRITICAL QUESTIONS -- CHAPTER I (LXV) THE CONNECTIONS OF THE PROBLEM -- CHAPTER II (LXVI) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER III (LXVII) ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM -- Section II THE CAUSAL ANTINOMY -- CHAPTER IV (LXVIII) THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S SOLUTION -- CHAPTER V (LXIX) DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM -- CHAPTER VI (LXX) DETERMINISM, CAUSAL AND FINALISTIC -- CHAPTER VII (LXXI) ONTOLOGICAL REGULARITY AS THE BASIS OF FREEDOM -- Section III THE ANTINOMY OF THE OUGHT -- CHAPTER VIII (LXXII) CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER IX (LXXIII) FALSE WAYS OF PROVING THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL -- CHAPTER X (LXXIV) THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM -- Section IV ETHICAL PHENOMENA, THEIR EFFICACY AS PROOFS -- CHAPTER XI (LXXV) "PROOFS" OF METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS -- CHAPTER XII (LXXVI) MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION -- CHAPTER XIII (LXXVII) RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY -- CHAPTER XIV (LXXVIII) THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT -- CHAPTER XV (LXXIX) SUPPLEMENTARY GROUPS OF FACTS -- CHAPTER XVI (LXXX) OUGHT AND THE WILL -- Section V ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL FREEDOM -- CHAPTER XVII (LXXXI) AUTONOMY OF THE PERSON AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES -- CHAPTER XVIII (LXXXII) SOLUTION OF THE OUGHT-ANTINOMY -- CHAPTER XIX (LXXXIII) PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED -- Section VI APPENDIX TO THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM -- CHAPTER XX (LXXXIV) APPARENT AND REAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY -- INDEX
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