Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Importance of Cultural Awareness to the Counterinsurgency Efforts in Southern Philippines]( "Importance of Cultural Awareness to the Counterinsurgency Efforts in Southern Philippines")
Importance of Cultural Awareness to the Counterinsurgency Efforts in Southern Philippines59,99 €![Three's Company: The Efficacy of Third-Party Intervention in Support of Counterinsurgency]( "Three's Company: The Efficacy of Third-Party Intervention in Support of Counterinsurgency")
Three's Company: The Efficacy of Third-Party Intervention in Support of Counterinsurgency60,99 €![Intervention in Vietnam: President Eisenhower's Foreign Policy]( "Intervention in Vietnam: President Eisenhower's Foreign Policy")
Intervention in Vietnam: President Eisenhower's Foreign Policy59,99 €![Advising Success: Lessons from American Military Assistance Efforts Since World War II]( "Advising Success: Lessons from American Military Assistance Efforts Since World War II")
Advising Success: Lessons from American Military Assistance Efforts Since World War II60,99 €![Study of China's Possible Military Intervention in the Event of a Sudden Change in North Korea]( "Study of China's Possible Military Intervention in the Event of a Sudden Change in North Korea")
Study of China's Possible Military Intervention in the Event of a Sudden Change in North Korea59,99 €![American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1918: A Study in Political-Military Relationships]( "American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1918: A Study in Political-Military Relationships")
American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1918: A Study in Political-Military Relationships60,99 €![Tail of the Dragon: Sri Lankan Efforts to Subdue the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]( "Tail of the Dragon: Sri Lankan Efforts to Subdue the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam")
Tail of the Dragon: Sri Lankan Efforts to Subdue the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam59,99 €
This research explores why the United States did not conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam. Authors such as Andrew Krepinevich have made the common argument that military leadership approached the insurgency problem in South Vietnam based on the "Army Concept" of war, a perception that wars should be fought conventionally and with massive firepower. They assert that this doctrine shaped the strategy in Vietnam. This paper makes an alternative argument that the "Army Concept" was facilitated in Vietnam by poor civilian leadership at the highest levels. It chronicles senior leader thought processes between 1963 and 1965 to demonstrate how policymakers shaped counterinsurgency efforts. The political goal of a negotiated settlement with North Vietnam, and the constraint of arms-length involvement, underpinned the mission of US combat troops and led to a disconnection between that mission and the larger counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam. Policymakers demonstrated this disconnection by their delay in placing all US operations under one command, and in their failure to press the South Vietnamese Government for reform. The Vietnam War serves as an example that our civilian leaders need to understand the multi-dimensional aspects of fighting an insurgency, and that military forces cannot solve all the problems. In future conflicts of this nature, policymakers need to find ways to reconcile the likely conflict between recognizing the sovereign rights of the government they are supporting, and at the same time trying to ensure the government is addressing the concerns of the majority of its people.