Rakesh V. Vohra

Mechanism Design

A Linear Programming Approach

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 184
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Mai 2011
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 15mm
• Gewicht: 428g
• ISBN-13: 9781107004368
• ISBN-10: 1107004365
• Artikelnr.: 34571335

Autorenporträt

Rakesh V. Vohra is the John L. and Helen Kellogg Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, where he is also Director of the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. He previously taught at the Fisher School of Business, Ohio State University and is the author of Advanced Mathematical Economics (2005). Professor Vohra has also completed a manuscript on the principles of pricing with Lakshman Krishnamurthi, Professor of Marketing at the Kellogg School. Professor Vohra received his doctorate in mathematics from the University of Maryland.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Introduction
2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences
3. Network flow problem
4. Incentive compatibility
5. Efficiency
6. Revenue maximization
7. Rationalizability.

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1. Introduction; 2. Arrow's theorem and its consequences; 3. Network flow problem; 4. Incentive compatibility; 5. Efficiency; 6. Revenue maximization; 7. Rationalizability.

Rezensionen

'The new book by Vohra is an excellent and most timely introduction into mechanism design. It offers a concise introduction to the theory of mechanism design, currently missing in the literature; it uses linear programming to great benefit to analyze the structure of incentives; and it provides a comprehensive account of the seminal results in auction and mechanism design. A splendid treatment for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in economic theory!' Dirk Bergemann, Yale University