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This monograph analyzes the Confederate Maryland campaign of 1862 in regard to several key concepts of military theory. As an operation involving extended effort and multiple battles, the campaign serves as a case study reinforcing the utility of classical military theory in operational planning. The monograph begins by developing a theoretical paradigm for use as a model to analyze the Confederate operations. Next, an historical overview of the strategic situation, campaign plan, and execution reveal the harsh realities of combat. The historical realities are then analyzed from a theoretical perspective. Conclusions are drawn on the utility of theory as a start point in campaigning. The paper finishes with a discussion of the implications of theory in future conflicts. The monograph concludes that Lee's campaign in Maryland was unsuccessful due to failure at the operational level of war. The Confederate strategy to acquire foreign recognition, liberate Maryland, and influence the upcoming northern Congressional elections was sound. Additionally, the tactics employed by the Army of Northern Virginia were exceptional. Prior to this campaign, the army won a stunning victory at Second Manassas with the aggressive leadership of Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and Stuart. Yet, in the Maryland operation, Lee's army was almost destroyed at the battle of Antietam, a result of poor operational planning and the intervention of friction and chance. During this operation the South lost more soldiers to straggling than at any other time in the war. The army reached its culmination point due to arduous marching. Decisions to capture Harper's Ferry further eroded the combat power of the army. The campaign to end the war became a desperate fight for survival at Antietam. In that light, the campaign is a clear example of weak operations being saved by tactics. While the tactics saved the army from destruction, strategically the South was forced back to defensive operations in Virginia. T