Lester Brickman is a Professor of Law and former Acting Dean at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University, where he teaches contracts and legal ethics. He has written extensively on legal ethics and his writings have been widely cited in treatises, casebooks, scholarly journals and judicial opinions. Brickman is a leading authority on contingency fees and his writings on that subject are the basis for a proposal to realign the contingency fee system with its policy roots and ethical mandates.
Inhaltsangabe
1. The origin of the contingency fee 2. How profitable are contingency fees? 3. Are contingency fee profits 'reasonable'? 4. How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition 5. Why the market has failed to correct the absence of price competition 6. Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition 7. The effects of incentives created by contingency fees 8. How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system 9. Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability 10. The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion 11. Current and future expansions of tort liability 12. The litigation explosion: 'fact or fiction'? 13. Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability 14. The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs 15. The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates 16. Class actions 17. Fees in class actions 18. How class action lawyers game fee setting 19. Securities class actions 20. Regulation through litigation 21. A new role for punitive damages: policy-making as a profit center 22. For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers Appendix A. A critique of Alex Tabarrok, the problem of contingent fees for waiters Appendix B. Calculating tort lawyers' effective hourly rates in 1960 Appendix C. Electronic discovery and the use of contract lawyers Appendix D. The HMO litigation Appendix E. The GM 'side saddle' truck litigation: the (short lived) triumph of litigation over the regulatory process Appendix F. Modern class actions undermine democratic precepts Appendix G. Other ways lawyers game class action fees Appendix H. Non-recourse financing of tort litigation Appendix I. Political contributions by tort lawyers and the U.S. chamber of commerce Appendix J. Special rules favoring lawyers Appendix K. The ultimate medical expense 'build-up': whiplash Appendix L. The effect of punitive damages on compensatory awards.
1. The origin of the contingency fee 2. How profitable are contingency fees? 3. Are contingency fee profits 'reasonable'? 4. How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition 5. Why the market has failed to correct the absence of price competition 6. Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition 7. The effects of incentives created by contingency fees 8. How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system 9. Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability 10. The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion 11. Current and future expansions of tort liability 12. The litigation explosion: 'fact or fiction'? 13. Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability 14. The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs 15. The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates 16. Class actions 17. Fees in class actions 18. How class action lawyers game fee setting 19. Securities class actions 20. Regulation through litigation 21. A new role for punitive damages: policy-making as a profit center 22. For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers Appendix A. A critique of Alex Tabarrok, the problem of contingent fees for waiters Appendix B. Calculating tort lawyers' effective hourly rates in 1960 Appendix C. Electronic discovery and the use of contract lawyers Appendix D. The HMO litigation Appendix E. The GM 'side saddle' truck litigation: the (short lived) triumph of litigation over the regulatory process Appendix F. Modern class actions undermine democratic precepts Appendix G. Other ways lawyers game class action fees Appendix H. Non-recourse financing of tort litigation Appendix I. Political contributions by tort lawyers and the U.S. chamber of commerce Appendix J. Special rules favoring lawyers Appendix K. The ultimate medical expense 'build-up': whiplash Appendix L. The effect of punitive damages on compensatory awards.
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