This book demonstrates that the American institutional combination of common law and the presidential system favored policy implementation through formal procedures by autonomous agencies, and that it induced the creation and development of independent regulatory commissions explicitly modeled after courts from the late nineteenth century.
This book demonstrates that the American institutional combination of common law and the presidential system favored policy implementation through formal procedures by autonomous agencies, and that it induced the creation and development of independent regulatory commissions explicitly modeled after courts from the late nineteenth century.
Hiroshi Okayama is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of Law at Keio University, Tokyo, Japan.
Inhaltsangabe
Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction 1. Chapter 1: Why Did the U.S. Administrative State Judicialize? 2. Chapter 2: The Judicial Roots of the Interstate Commerce Commission 3. Chapter 3: Creating the "Supreme Court of Finance" 4. Chapter 4: Retrenching Administrative Commissions, Expanding State Judiciality 5. Chapter 5: The Institutional Consolidation of the Independent Regulatory Commissions Conclusion Notes Works Cited Index
Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction 1. Chapter 1: Why Did the U.S. Administrative State Judicialize? 2. Chapter 2: The Judicial Roots of the Interstate Commerce Commission 3. Chapter 3: Creating the "Supreme Court of Finance" 4. Chapter 4: Retrenching Administrative Commissions, Expanding State Judiciality 5. Chapter 5: The Institutional Consolidation of the Independent Regulatory Commissions Conclusion Notes Works Cited Index
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