Ferenc Forgó, Jeno Szep, Ferenc Szidarovszky

Introduction to the Theory of Games

Concepts, Methods, Applications

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Game theory, defined in the broadest sense, is a collection of mathematical models designed for the analysis of strategic aspects of situations of conflict and cooperation in a broad spectrum of fields including economics, politics, biology, engineering, and operations research. This book, besides covering the classical results of game theory, places special emphasis on methods of determining `solutions' of various game models. Generalizations reaching beyond the `convexity paradigm' and leading to nonconvex optimization problems are enhanced and discussed in more detail than in standard texts on this subject. The development is theoretical-mathematical interspersed with elucidating interpretations and examples.
Audience: The material in the book is accessible to PhD and graduate students and will also be of interest to researchers. Solid knowledge of standard undergraduate mathematics is required to read the book.

Produktdetails

• Nonconvex Optimization and Its Applications 32
• Verlag: Springer / Springer US / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-1-4419-4811-3
• Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1999
• Seitenzahl: 352
• Erscheinungstermin: 19. November 2010
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 155mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 534g
• ISBN-13: 9781441948113
• ISBN-10: 1441948112
• Artikelnr.: 32135403

Inhaltsangabe

Preface. Introduction. I: Noncooperative games. 1. Noncooperative games
forms. 2. Nash equilibria. 3. Existence of Nash equilibrium. 4. Uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium. 5. Mixed extensions of finite games. 6. Computation of
equilibria in mixed extensions of finite games. 7. The oligopoly game. 8.
Two-person zero-sum games. 9. Matrix games. 10. Games played over the unit
hypercube. 11. Bimatrix games. 12. Repeated games. 13. Games with
incomplete information. II: Cooperative games. 14. Games in characteristic
function form. 15. The core. 16. Stable sets. 17. The nucleolus. 18. The
Shapley value. 19. The kernel and the bargaining set. 20. Game theory and
cost allocation. 21. Games without transferable utility. 22. The Nash
bargaining solution and its extensions. 23. Two-person bargaining
processes. Problems and exercises. Appendix. References. Index.