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A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.

Produktbeschreibung
A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.
Autorenporträt
Clifford J. Carrubba is a Professor of Political Science, Chair of the Political Science Department, and Professor of Law, by courtesy, at Emory University, Atlanta. He also founded and is currently serving as the Director of the Institute for Quantitative Theory and Methods at Emory University. Carrubba has published in the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organizations, Political Analysis, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, and the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.